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Abstract

Current Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) designs require multiple operators for each
vehicle, partly due to imperfect automation matched with the complex operational environment.
This study examines the effectiveness of future UAS automation by explicitly addressing the
human/machine trust relationship during system architecting. A pedigreed engineering model of
trust between human and machine was developed and applied to a laboratory-developed microUAS for Special Operations. This unprecedented investigation answered three primary
questions. Can previous research be used to create a useful trust model for systems engineering?
How can trust be considered explicitly within the DoD Architecture Framework? Can the utility
of architecting trust be demonstrated on a given UAS architecture? By addressing operator trust
explicitly during architecture development, system designers can incorporate more effective
automation. The results provide the Systems Engineering community a new modeling technique
for early human systems integration.
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Architecting Human Operator Trust in Automation to Improve System
Effectiveness in Multiple Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Control

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have attained a prominent role in Joint warfighting
over the last ten years, particularly in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI
FREEDOM. While the air vehicles themselves are uninhabited, it is a fallacy to believe that
humans are a less important component of the overall UAS than of any other aerial systems. In
fact, some current UAS designs require multiple operators for each vehicle, largely due to the
limited ability of existing automation to respond effectively to the complexity of the operational
environment.
On December 6, 1999, a U.S. Air Force Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
ran off a runway at Edwards Air Force Base causing extensive damage to the vehicle. One of the
contributing factors to the crash was overreliance on the system’s automation. The UAV
experienced an in-flight problem with the onboard temperature regulation system within the
avionics compartment. The aircraft was commanded to return to base and the system’s
automation implemented a secondary contingency plan to conduct an automated landing and
taxi. The preprogrammed automation instructed the aircraft to accelerate to a speed of 155 knots
between any two waypoints if the altitude between the points varied by more than a pre-specified
amount. Unbeknown to the operators, two of the waypoints on the taxi path exceeded the
threshold and the aircraft accelerated to a speed where it was unable to negotiate a turn and ran
off the runway (Williams, 2006).
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Human operators under-relying on the Global Hawk UAV automation is another problem
that is currently plaguing the platform, negatively impacting the effectiveness of the system.
Based on crew interviews conducted in September 2008 at Beale Air Force Base, CA, current
training emphasizes the need for operators to check the dialogue box on the system display after
each command is given in order to ensure that the air vehicle is functioning as commanded.
However, there is no confirmation from the air vehicle that a command was received until the
aircraft is observed to execute the command. This lack of feedback from the automation or
knowledge of its state causes operators to double check their work, which takes time and
increases the cognitive workload of the operator. In addition, the operator’s focus is diverted
from other critical tasks during this period in order to develop sufficient situational awareness of
system behavior to determine whether intervention is required (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008).
These two cases exemplify the fact that human operators have a tendency to either over
rely or under rely on a system’s automation. Underutilizing the automation increases the
cognitive workload of the operator, which can adversely affect their ability to perform
effectively. Over relying on the automation can have drastic consequences, including damage to
or loss of the air vehicle. Therefore, it is essential that future systems are designed to provide the
appropriate level and type of automation to facilitate collaboration between the human and the
machine counterpart. In accomplishing this task, emphasis should be placed on the interaction
between the human and machine, in order to create an environment that fosters an appropriate
level of trust by the human operator(s), as will be discussed below.

1.2 Problem Statement
As the demand for UAS capability has grown, the Air Force’s ability to produce missionready operators for these specialized systems has been stressed. This highlights one of the
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primary emphases within the Human Systems Integration (HSI) community. The community is
accentuating the need to account for the human as part of the system during early system design
to make system operation more effective and efficient. Rather than many operators per vehicle,
future systems should incorporate effective automation to allow a single operator to control
multiple vehicles performing a variety of tasks, potentially in synchronization, in a fluid
operational environment. The challenge is to have the appropriate number of people with respect
to the cognitive tasks.
Automation is “the technology that actively selects data, transforms information, makes
decisions, or controls processes” (Lee & See, 2004). However, a large body of research shows
that more automation is not necessarily better automation (Parasuraman, Barnes, & Cosenzo,
2007). In order to be effective, the automation must be well-designed, reliable, and tailored to
complement the capabilities of the human operator in varying supervisory roles (Cummings,
Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007) (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008).
The best automation, however, is ineffective if not used or used improperly. In this
regard, the operator’s level of trust in the automation is a vital factor in determining its
operational effectiveness. This form of trust is also known as social or "pragmatic" trust due to
its analog in human cognition (Konstantinou, Liagkou, Spirakis, Stamatiou, & Yung, 2005), as
opposed to “trust” in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and other security related aspects of
automated systems. Pragmatic trust, which is the focus of this research effort, can be defined as
the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by
uncertainty and vulnerability (Lee & See, 2004). If a human operator trusts automation
inappropriately and the automation fails, effectiveness is reduced; sometimes catastrophically.
Conversely, if the operator chooses not to trust the automation and instead controls the system
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manually, human error and inefficiency can reduce effectiveness. Realistic trust that reflects the
true capabilities of the automation enables maximum effectiveness for a given system. The
authors of this research developed the following diagram to portray such a relationship between
operator trust and mission effectiveness.

Figure 1 – Realistic Trust Enables Maximal Effectiveness

One problem is that trust, as with many aspects of human cognition, is difficult to
quantify. If a robust metric existed for trust, systems engineers and program managers could use
it to evaluate competing system designs. The lack of human performance metrics has been
repeatedly noted in research on Human Systems Integration, which is “the interdisciplinary
technical and management processes for integrating human considerations within and across all
system elements” (INCOSE, August 2007). The community consensus is that better quantitative
tools and methods are required in order to fully address this shortfall (Committee on HumanSystem Design Support for Changing Technology, 2007). Previous research efforts have
identified common factors that influence trust (Antifakos, Kern, Schiele, & Schwaninger, 2005);
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008); (Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck,
2003), while others have proposed mathematical models of trust (Lee & See, 2004);
(Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998); (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998) and have
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attempted to measure trust empirically (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000). Building on this body of
work, it may be possible now to improve overall mission effectiveness by explicitly designing
systems to elicit appropriate levels of trust in UAS automation.

1.3 Objectives
This research will attempt to answer three main questions:
•

Can previous research be used to create a useful trust model for systems engineering?

•

How can trust be considered explicitly within the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF)
in order to improve the effectiveness and suitability of future UAS designs?

•

Can the utility of architecting trust be demonstrated on a given UAS architecture?
Results can then be used by capability planners and early DoD acquisition processes in

order to address trust factors explicitly during design, thereby improving the effectiveness of
automation in UAS architectures.

1.4 Scope and Assumptions
Trust has been the focus of myriad studies in numerous disciplines. This thesis cannot
possibly encompass all previous work related to trust, nor address trust for all situations humans
may encounter. Rather, it will focus on architecting trust in the context of effective UAS control.
This effort will focus on architecting trust by adapting existing research to (1) determine how
trust manifests in various aspects of UAS architecture, and (2) how each factor can be addressed
to foster an appropriate level of operator trust in the system.
Several assertions must be made to effectively address trust within a system architecture.
The first is that trust is not self-contained or binary, but rather is composed of a set of cognitive
inputs that act in combination and along a continuum. The second is that, while there will be
some variance between individuals, humans will tend to respond to those inputs in ways similar
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enough to predict. This predicted response will be especially true of military operators with
common training, organization, and ethos. Lastly, while the fundamental physical mechanisms
of human cognition are not completely understood, the effects of human cognition on decisionmaking can be quantified. These assertions are supported by decades of empirical evidence from
trust-related research, which will be described in Chapter 2.

1.5 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the extensive body of work related to trust in
automation and will also describe the fundamentals of UAS automation with an emphasis on
factors that affect operator trust. Chapter 3 will provide a detailed analysis of trust and its
component elements through the development of a systems engineering model of trust. In
addition, Chapter 3 will introduce the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF)
and related architecture development concepts. Chapter 4 will depict the application of the trust
lens to the architecture process and demonstrate its applicability to improve the architecture of an
existing UAS. Chapter 5 will summarize our findings and identify recommendations for further
research.

6

Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Overview and Scope
As previously stated, trust relationships have been extensively researched across many
disciplines, including psychology, human factors, ergonomics, management, and systems
engineering. Much of the large body of research on the topic has dealt with human-human trust.
Yet, as we interact with automation more and more frequently in our daily lives, the topic of
human-machine trust has steadily gained importance. Human-machine trust is especially
relevant in operations involving UAS, because human operators are almost entirely reliant on
system feedback due to their physical separation from the air vehicle. What follows is a targeted
summary of those works most directly relevant to the thesis objectives: identifying trust factors
inherent in single-operator multi-UAV control and considering those factors explicitly when
developing UAS architectures.
Research related to human performance and interaction with automation began as early as
the 1960s (Senders, 1964); (Fitts & Posner, 1967) and began to focus on automation reliability
and resulting human operator trust in the 1970s (Halpin, Johnson, & Thornberry, 1973).
Subsequent research focused on identifying social and psychological factors that influenced trust
(Barber, 1983), categorizing user acceptance or rejection of unfamiliar automation in industrial
applications (Zuboff, 1988) and analyzing the trustworthiness of automation (Sheridan, 1988).
More recently, researchers have attempted to identify and model the relationships of factors that
influence operator trust, (Muir, 1994) (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998) (Cohen,
Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998), to measure trust empirically (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000),
and to predict operators’ tendency to trust and rely on automation under various conditions
(Bisantz & Seong, 2001) (Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson, 2001) (Dzindolet,
Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003) (Gao & Lee, 2006). These and similar works
7

defined the parameters of trust, such as the concepts of appropriate trust, misuse, disuse,
reliability, and others, which will be reviewed shortly. Lee & See (2004) summarized these and
roughly 200 other published works on trust, and proposed specific recommendations to enable
designers to elicit appropriate operator reliance on automation. Lee & See’s findings provide a
framework for much of the remainder of this chapter.
Most recently, two studies have proposed automation design guidelines for a single
operator/multiple UAV system (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008) (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, &
Mitchell, 2007). These studies did not address trust explicitly, but examined situational
awareness and attention; therefore they present an opportunity to apply the concepts from this
chapter.

2.2 Trust and its Parameters
The definition of trust varies depending on the context in which it is used, as has been
illustrated by much of the early research on the subject. Bhattacharya et al. (1998) established
several characteristics useful in defining trust: First, trust exists in an uncertain and risky
environment, and is unnecessary when certainty exists. Second, trust represents an expectancy
by the trustor that reflects some aspect of predictability. Third, any definition of trust must
account for trust’s strength and importance, where strength reflects the degree of confidence the
trustor has in the expected outcome, and importance represents the value of the expected
outcome to the trustor. Fourth, trust is situation and person specific. And last, trust reflects the
degree of expectation of a positive outcome (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998). In
short, whether the trustee “agent” is automated or human trust has been defined as:
“the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation
characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability.” (Lee & See, 2004)
8

It is important to draw a distinction between trust and reliance. Trust is an attitude, and
reliance is a behavior reflecting an intention or willingness to act. According to Lee & See
(2004), “trust stands between beliefs about the characteristics of the automation and the intent to
rely on the automation.” Further, “trust guides – but does not completely determine – reliance.”
2.2.1 Trust Dependencies
Trust and trustworthiness are not innate qualities, but rather depend on many factors. As
mentioned previously, trust is situation and person specific, and often varies over time. Yet,
common elements appear repeatedly in the literature regarding trust.
2.2.1.1 Environment and Context
The environment in which automation is being used plays an important role in an
operator’s need to trust. The environment’s importance is highlighted by the Human Systems
Integration (HSI) community that classifies environment as one of the nine primary HSI
domains. As discussed by Bhattacharya, et al. (1998), trust is unnecessary when outcomes are
certain. Conversely, trust is an important factor in highly uncertain and risky environments,
where decisions must be made quickly with imperfect information. In such situations, an
individual’s propensity to trust is shaped by individual, cultural, and organizational context.
Cultural and organizational contexts influence trust as individuals interact in ways that
inform them about the trustworthiness of others and by establishing general norms and expected
behaviors. Individual context refers to a specific person’s history of interactions with the trustee
and their general inclination to trust, which can vary from one individual to the next.
Individual variation in tendency to trust is important to consider when evaluating
automation, since variations may affect reliance in ways that are not directly related to the
characteristics of the automation. While this must be taken into account by designers, previous
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research has shown that trust tendency as a personality trait can be reliably measured, and that
the trust tendency influences behavior in predictable ways (Lee & See, 2004).
2.2.1.2 Actions Taken
Actors (be they human or machine) engage in actions intended to produce specific results
and these individual decisions and actions act together to produce outcomes. However, since
causality can be difficult to determine in an uncertain environment, it is not always possible to
predict the consequences of alternative courses of action. In some situations, one individual will
know the outcome of the other’s action before being required to act, while in other situations
each must act simultaneously or without knowledge of the consequences of each other’s actions.
In either case, individuals will predict the other’s action and subjectively assign it a probability.
This probability represents the strength of their expectation, or level of confidence in the
trustee’s predictability (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998). High predictability is a major
factor in fostering trust in automation, since it allows a trustor to establish accurate expectations
of the automation’s capability and behavior.
2.2.1.3 Outcomes and Consequences
“Clearly, trust concerns an expectancy or an attitude regarding the likelihood of favorable
responses” (Lee & See, 2004). In addition to predicting a specific action, individuals will also
assign a probability that the actions taken by the other will be appropriate and effective toward
achieving the desired outcome. This prediction is influenced by the degree of importance the
individual attaches to achieving a specific outcome, which is often related to the perceived
consequences of success or failure. Achievement or failure to attain a favorable outcome affects
future trust by creating, reinforcing, or refuting expectations of the trustee’s competence
(Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998). For example, the crash of a multimillion dollar
UAV usually generates intense pressure to isolate and correct the cause. Until that is done, UAV
10

operators may lose trust in the system. Interestingly, though, some studies have shown that high
complacency individuals, or those with high levels of trust in automation, were actually more
successful in making accurate predictions, and thus more likely to detect automation failures as
they happened, than low-trust individuals (Lee & See, 2004).
2.2.1.4 Information about Trustee
Bhattacharya et al. (1995) describe trust as a multidimensional construct that is based on
trustee characteristics. The relevant trustee characteristics are any that inform the individual
about the ability of the trustee to achieve the trustor’s goals. These include the nature,
competence, and trustworthiness of the trustee, among other factors. One of the major questions
is “what is to be trusted?” This is also known as specificity which is “the degree to which trust
corresponds to a particular component or aspect of the trustee.” For example, an operator may
have different levels of trust for a system as a whole than for a specific mode of a given
subsystem. (Lee & See, 2004)
2.2.1.5 Operator Perception
Operator perception can influence trust and affect reliance in many ways. Beliefs and
perceptions are part of the information base that determines the attitudes that affect operator trust
and reliance. Self-confidence, perceived mental workload, situational awareness, and time
stress are the major perceptions that an operator will create that will directly influence his/her
trust in the automation and reliance upon it.
Lee and See (2004) claim the level of trust combines with other attitudes and
expectations, such as operator workload and self-confidence, to determine the intention to rely
upon the automation of a system. If an operator has low trust in the system and high selfconfidence, then they will tend to disuse the automation. Likewise, if an operator has high trust
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in system automation and their self-confidence is low, then they will tend to misuse the
automation. In general, individuals tend to rely more upon automation when their confidence in
their own ability is lower than in the automation, and vice-versa. These biases in self-confidence
can have a substantial effect on the appropriate reliance on automation (Lee & See, 2004).
These results were demonstrated in a series of tests. A study of a vehicle navigation aid
found that system errors cause trust and reliance to decline more for those in a familiar city,
whose self-confidence was high, as compared with those in an unfamiliar city, whose selfconfidence was low (Lee & See, 2004). Likewise, in a study between pilots and students,
students were found to have more self-confidence and therefore were less inclined to use the
given automation than were the pilots who were familiar with the automation and tended to rely
upon it more (Lee & See, 2004).
Mental workload can be described as the relation between the function relating the
mental resources of a task and those resources available to be supplied by the human operator
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008). Human mental workload is paramount in
developing a successful transition from current operations of many operators to one UAV to one
operator controlling multiple UAVs. The challenge in accomplishing this transition is to
increase the level of system autonomy in an effective way that will reduce human workload
(Cummings & Mitchell, 2008).
However, simply increasing system automation will not necessarily improve system
performance through a reduction in mental workload. In abnormal or unexpected situations, the
automation could fail; possibly causing a catastrophic event to occur while the operator may not
be engaged in the task (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008). The lack of transparency and trust in the
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system can potentially lead to increased operator mental workload in attempting to determine
whether or not the automation is working correctly and if intervention is required. Therefore,
architects should consider operator trust when evaluating levels and types of automation in order
to reduce mental workload, wait times, interactions times, and queuing times, while improving
the effectiveness of the system.
Cohen et al. (1998) also stressed the importance and relationship of mental
workload/time stress and trust in decision making. They proposed a direct trade-off exists with
respect to time between trust and decision-making, as shown in Figure 2. If an operator’s trust in
the aid’s conclusion falls in the upper region, then the user should simply accept the conclusion
without taking further time. If the trust falls in the lower region, the user should reject the aid’s
conclusion without further delay. Finally, if trust falls in the intermediate region, then it is
worthwhile for the user to take time to decide on a course of action.

Figure 2 – Operators Verify Less as Time Stress Increases (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998)
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The upper dashed line in the figure portrays the typical amount of trust an operator has in
a particular automation over time. In the beginning, the initial trust is typically low and depends
upon factors such as context, predictability, and expectations. The relationships between these
factors will be explained in detail later in the chapter. The user’s confidence in the automation
typically increases as more information is collected and the trust relationship matures (Cohen,
Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998).
The key variables that influence the reliance decisions in the model above are uncertainty
and time stress. Time stress acts as the main cost of delay parameter in determining the upper
and lower bounds on the figure. As the Figure 2 depicts, action is more imperative when the cost
of delay is great, even with high uncertainty about trust. In addition, as time stress increases the
upper and lower bounds move towards each other, indicating the need to make a decision with
less verification at the same levels of trust (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998).
Situational awareness (SA) is “the perception of the elements in the environment within a
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status
in the near future” (Endsley & Garland, 2000). SA is not a choice or action taken based upon
presented information, or a consequence of the diagnosis, nor is it a measure of a human
operator’s performance. Instead, SA is the operator's mental model of the current and nearfuture situation. Studies have shown that SA varies inversely as the level of automation is
increased and decreased in UAV operations. Drury & Scott (2008) developed the following
diagram, Figure 3, to portray this concept.
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Figure 3 - Human Awareness Changes With Levels of Automation (Drury & Scott, 2008)

As depicted, when the level of automation of a UAV increases, the level of information
detail (LOID) and thus operator’s associated SA with regard to the UAV will tend to decrease.
For example, the Global Hawk UAV is a highly automated air vehicle that has the ability to fly
between pre-programmed way points, and therefore human operators need less SA of the
aircraft’s flight-related information than operators would need of a low-automation Predator
UAV pursuing a time sensitive target (Drury & Scott, 2008).
Past research efforts have categorized SA into the following three levels: level 1 –
perception of information, level 2 – comprehension of current situation, and level 3 – projection
of future status. Parasuraman et al. (2008) stress the notion that these levels can be accurately
measured to provide an understanding of the SA that the current system automation is providing.
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For example, visual scanning tools are commercially available to aid in the assessment of level 1
SA (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008).
SA will also vary depending upon other factors such as an operator’s trust in the
automation. As mentioned earlier, as a system becomes more reliable, operators tend to develop
more trust in the automation and have a tendency to develop an automation bias towards it.
Previous research efforts have pointed to a correlation between automation bias and decreased
SA. Likewise, a lack of trust in automation tends to foster an environment where operators
closely supervise the system, thus potentially increasing their SA with regards to the UAV
operations (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008). This illustrates a complex relationship that varies
over time between perceptions like SA and mental workload, operator trust and its effect on
reliance, and the resulting impact on mission effectiveness.
2.2.2 Trust Bases / Expectations
The diverse and copious research that has been conducted in the area of trust has
generated numerous definitions. Many of these definitions focus on trust as an attitude or
expectation that a human operator has towards the automation. The group of researchers in this
category have defined trust in some of the following ways: “expectation related to subjective
probability an individual assigns to the occurrence to some set of future events”, “expectation of
technically competent role performance”; or “expectations of fiduciary obligation and
responsibility, that is, the expectation that some others in our social relationships have moral
obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special concern for others’ interests above their
own” (Lee & See, 2004).
Lee and See (2004) claim that trust evolves in a complex individual, cultural, and
organizational context. Within this context the role of expectations plays a vital part. For
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example, they state that the individual follows a social learning approach in which expectations
for a particular situation are determined by specific previous experiences with situations that are
perceived as similar. They also report that trust is a generalized expectancy that is independent
of specific experiences, but rather based on the generalization of a large number of diverse
experiences (Lee & See, 2004). In other words, the prior experiences an individual brings into a
trust relationship help to shape his/her expectations of the trustee, and those expectations are
likely to affect the operator’s future interaction with the trustee. This illustrates the iterative and
evolving nature of trust.
Likewise, Lee and See (2004) state that the organizational context reflects the
interactions between people that inform them about the trustworthiness of others, which can
include reputation and gossip, while the social context is comprised of a set of norms and
expectations. Therefore, individuals enter into arrangements with each other, or with sources of
automation, with a predetermined level of trust based upon these contexts. For example, Lee and
See (2004) assert that people will initially trust an engineer not because of the ability of any
specific person, but because of the underlying education and regulatory structure that governs
people in the role of an engineer. In other words, they trust because of an expectation that an
engineer has earned some measure of trust by virtue of professional competence.
Bonnie Muir (1994), meanwhile, states that a human operator’s decision to allow (or
conversely override) automation to control a process demonstrates a certain level of trust in the
automation. Therefore, it is necessary to have an appropriate model of trust in human-machine
interaction to provide a basis for developing effective automation. The model presented in this
research assumes a definition of trust consistent with Lee and See and expands it by describing
the multidimensional character of trust, including three specific bases, or expectations: technical
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competence, persistence, and fiduciary responsibility (Barber, 1983). These bases appear similar
in concept to those described by Lee & See (2004) as ability, integrity, and benevolence.
2.2.2.1 Technical Competence / Ability
Technical competence simply means that the trustor believes the trustee has the ability to
perform the assigned task successfully (Muir, 1994). Lee & See (2004) define ability as “the
group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable the trustee to influence the
domain.” The trustor’s perception of the trustee’s ability, as well as similar characteristics such
as reliability and predictability, contribute to some expectation of performance, which is a
primary component of trust especially in the early stage of a trust relationship. Section 2.2.3 will
discuss performance’s relationship to trust.
2.2.2.2 Persistence / Integrity
Persistence refers to an expectation of constancy, which, for example, allows the operator
to construct a mental model of the automation through experience interacting with it. (Muir,
1994) This is similar to integrity, which Lee & See (2004) define as “the degree to which the
trustee adheres to a set of principles the trustor finds acceptable.” A trustor’s perception of the
trustee’s integrity can be considered to derive from observations of ability over a prolonged
period, and affords the trustor an expectation of dependability, which is another primary dynamic
of trust, described in section 2.2.3.
2.2.2.3 Fiduciary Responsibility / Benevolence
Finally, fiduciary responsibility applies when trustee competence is unknown, and the
trustor must assume the trustee will act appropriately. This often occurs when an operator
assumes a system will meet its design-based performance criteria when it is operating as
intended (Muir, Trust in Automation: Part I. Theoretical issues in the study of trust and human
intervention in automated systems, 1994). This is similar to Lee and See’s (2004) term
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benevolence, which they define as “the extent to which the intents and motivations of the trustee
are aligned with those of the trustor.” In a mature trust relationship, the trustor’s perception of
trustee benevolence prompts faith, which is a judgment that the trustee can be relied on, even
though specific actions and their outcomes may be unknown at the time.
2.2.3 Trust Dynamics / Influences
In addition to these three bases (persistence/integrity, competence/ability, and fiduciary
responsibility/benevolence); Muir identifies three dynamics of trust: predictability,
dependability, and faith (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). These dynamics appear consistent
with Lee and See’s (2004) factors of performance, process, and purpose. Each of these dynamics
applies to greater or lesser degrees depending on the maturity of the trust relationship, and each
requires varying amounts and types of information in order to sustain appropriate trust.
2.2.3.1 Predictability
Predictability is important in the early stages of a trust relationship, and requires visibility
of specific behaviors, or performance. For example, operators will judge automation based on its
ability to deliver consistent and desirable results. However, several factors influence
predictability judgments. First is actual predictability: the automation’s performance. Lee & See
(2004) describe performance as “what the automation does. More specifically, performance
refers to the competency or expertise as demonstrated by its ability to achieve the operator’s
goals.” Next is perceived predictability, or transparency. The operator must be able to observe
the automation’s behavior in order to estimate predictability. In general, simple automation will
be more predictable and observable than automation that has many degrees of freedom. Lastly,
the stability of the environment may affect predictability, since an unstable environment may
cause difficulty for an operator to distinguish apparent unpredictability, which should be ignored,
from inherent unpredictability, which should reduce trust (Muir, 1994). During developmental
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and operational testing, testers carefully measure the performance of system components and
conduct repeated, controlled trials to isolate all possible variables, in order to minimize apparent
unpredictability. However, exercising all variables is not possible in the operational
environment. Operators must rely on built-in transparency, realistic training, and prior
experience to accurately predict system behavior.
2.2.3.2 Dependability
As the trust relationship matures, focus changes from specific behaviors to an assessment
of general dependability, or the extent to which the trustee can be relied upon. Operators who
are familiar with the automation will begin to trust based on overall experience rather than
specific behaviors, and will have a greater understanding of the situations in which the
automation may be untrustworthy. Lee & See (2004) describe this tendency in terms of process,
which is “the degree to which the automation’s algorithms are appropriate for the situation and
able to achieve the operator’s goals.” Operator judgment of automation dependability is
enhanced when operators push the boundaries of the automation’s capabilities into uncertain and
risky scenarios, allowing them to observe how the automation reacts beyond its design limits
(Muir, 1994). This “pushing the envelope” often happens during test & evaluation or training,
but may also occur in the operational environment. In sum, Lee & See (2004) assert that
“operators will trust the automation if its algorithms can be understood and seem capable of
achieving the operator’s goals in the current situation.” This assertion is reinforced by inferences
the operator draws by observing the automation’s performance over a period of time.
2.2.3.3 Faith
In the final stage, faith represents a fully mature trust relationship. Here, faith is defined
as “a closure against doubt in the face of an uncertain future.” In this stage, the operator’s
perception of the appropriateness and flexibility of the automation allows him to control the
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system effectively, even without a complete understanding of the automation’s complex
behavior. Faith, in this context, is similar to purpose, which Lee & See (2004) define as “the
degree to which the automation is being used within the realm of the designer’s intent.” This
assumes the designer’s intent has been communicated to the operator. However, the operator
also realizes the potential for unforeseen interactions and the limitations inherent in any
mitigating procedures (Muir, 1994).
2.2.4 Muir’s Model
The integrated model of the relationship between automation, the operator’s trust, and
predictions about the automation’s behavior developed by Muir (1994) is depicted in Figure 4.
This model depicts the multidimensional trust construct. As previously discussed, human
operator’s expectation of the automation’s persistence, competence, and responsibility plays an
important role in establishing the initial level of trust in the automation. In addition, system and
operator confidence is related to the plausibility of the inferences made. In this context,
confidence refers to a level of expectation associated with a particular prediction, rather than the
overall trust relationship.

Muir's model allows a qualitative assessment of the appropriateness

of operator trust in a given system or component (Muir, 1994).

21

Figure 4 - Muir's Model of Trust (1994)

2.3 Reliance
Many studies have demonstrated that in terms of man-machine interaction, “trust is an
attitude toward automation that affects reliance and … can be measured consistently” (Lee &
See, 2004). While others have characterized trust as an intention or willingness to act, Lee &
See (2004) assert that trust is an attitude that affects reliance. In this context, reliance is the
operator’s intention or willingness to act, in the form of a decision to use or not to use
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automation. While trust is not the only influence on operator reliance, it is a key factor “when
the complexity of the automation makes a complete understanding impractical and when the
situation demands adaptive behavior that procedures cannot guide” (Lee & See, 2004). These
conditions often result in inappropriate reliance, which falls generally into two categories:
misuse and disuse (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Misuse refers to failures that occur when
operators rely on automation in excess of its capabilities, i.e. over-trust. Disuse refers to operator
rejection of automation when it is capable, i.e. under-trust.
2.3.1 Misuse
Human operators will tend to rely more upon automation as its reliability and their
understanding of the automation increases. In some cases, this can lead to overreliance, or
automation bias. Automation bias is a decision bias that occurs when operators become overreliant on the automation and do not verify the accuracy of automated recommendations. This
situation could lead to complacency and erroneous, if not catastrophic, errors (Cummings, Bruni,
Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007).
Very high levels of trust in automation that are not perfectly reliable can be associated
with overreliance and failure to monitor the “raw” information sources that provide input to the
automated system. This phenomenon is known as complacency (Parasuraman, Sheridan, &
Wickens, 2008). For example, if operators are given a tool to measure these “raw” information
sources, complacency can be measured by evaluating whether or not the operator uses the tool
more or less often under automation than under manual control. Complacency, as reflected by a
strategy of allocating attention away from the automated task to other concurrent tasks, can be
measured using eye recording devices. Using this approach, the eye movement recordings
should show that operators scan the raw information sources less frequently when using
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automation than when performing the task manually or less frequently when automation
reliability is higher than lower (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008).
This concept was demonstrated in a study by Senders (1964). In his research, he showed
that human observers tasked with monitoring for abnormal readings on multiple dials with
different frequencies of changing values made eye movements to the dials in proportion to
bandwidth (Senders, 1964). Moray and Inagaki expanded on this study suggesting that a human
operator who monitored automation at a rate less than the optimal Nyquist frequency (which
represents a sampling rate twice that of the highest frequency present in the sampled data) was
complacent while the one who monitored at a greater rate was skeptical. Individuals monitoring
at the Nyquist rate are considered to be well calibrated (Moray & Inagaki, 2000). This approach
may provide system engineers a proxy measure for trust; however, its applicability in design still
needs to be proven.
2.3.2 Disuse
Past studies of human-machine interaction have shown that under-reliance, or disuse,
tends to be less common than misuse in many situations (Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, &
Anderson, 2001). When disuse does occur, it reduces the benefits technology offers and can
negatively impact mission effectiveness (Pina, Donmez, & Cummings, 2008). Disuse is most
commonly caused by false alarms, which reduce operator trust over time and increase workload
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Disuse due to false alarms can be decreased through training,
specifically by providing the operator knowledge of the automation’s error rate (Dzindolet,
Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson, 2001). However, not all disuse is trust-induced. Design and
ease of use are also factors, as in cases where automation requires substantial time to configure
and activate. An operator under time constraint or high workload may choose not to rely on
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automation for these reasons, even though the automation is highly trusted to produce effective
results (Lee & See, 2004). For example, a pilot concentrating on landing an aircraft may be
inclined to disuse its flight management system if air traffic control changes require the
automation to be reprogrammed during the last minutes of final descent. (Parasuraman, Barnes,
& Cosenzo, 2007)
2.3.3 Reliance Mismatch Factors
Appropriate reliance exists when the operator’s level of trust in the automation matches
the automation’s true capabilities, which may not be clearly or accurately understood by the
operator. (Improving this relationship is a key goal of this research.) Mismatches between
operator trust and automation capability can be described in terms of three factors: calibration,
resolution, and specificity (Lee & See, 2004). Calibration is the direct correlation between the
operator’s trust and the automation’s capability, similar to misuse/disuse (Lee & Moray, 1994);
(Muir, 1987). Resolution is the degree to which changes in automation capability affect operator
trust (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998). For example, with low resolution, a large change
in capability will have little effect on trust. Lastly, specificity refers to the degree to which trust
correlates to a specific component or aspect of the automation. Specificity can be further
differentiated as functional, in which trust is modulated by specific functions, sub-functions, and
modes of operation, and temporal, in which trust is modulated by changes in context that affect
the automation’s capability (Lee & See, 2004).
The objective is for the operator to have good calibration, high resolution, and high
specificity in order to achieve appropriate trust. Lee & See (2004) contend that these principles
should “guide design, evaluation, and training to enhance human-automation partnerships.”
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2.4 Design Recommendations for Incorporating Trust
2.4.1 Use Adaptive Automation
Cummings et al. (2007) present different levels of automation based on those developed
by Parasuraman et al. (2000) in order to conduct a trade study to determine the benefits and
shortfalls of each in regard for single operator, multiple UAV command and control. One of the
levels of automation they present is management-by-exception. This level occurs when
automation decides to take an action based on some set of pre-determined criteria, and only gives
operators a chance to veto the automation’s decision (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell,
2007). Their findings portray management-by-exception as dangerous due to its tendency to
foster an automation bias atmosphere.
This condition of automation bias, or overreliance, was one of the critical contributing
factors that led to fratricide during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2004, a U.S. Army Patriot
System engaged and shot down a British Tornado and an American F/A-18. The system was
designed to use a management-by-exception automation where operators were given 15 seconds
to veto an automation decision. In this case, the system was highly complex, confusing, and
comprised of often incorrect displays (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007). This
situation led the operators to become over reliant upon the automation and they failed to veto the
computer’s decision, which resulted in three coalition deaths.
If, instead, the automation adapts to the needs of the operator in a given situation, mission
effectiveness can be enhanced by making the best use of human-machine collaboration.
Parasuraman, et al. (2000) proposed a four-stage model of human information processing,
composed of information acquisition, information analysis, decision and action selection, and

26

action implementation. 1 They then proposed that these stages could benefit from different levels
of automation, but that the specific implementation would be situation and application dependent
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). For example, Parasuraman et al. (2007) simulated a
combat identification system in which operators were asked to identify changes to a situation
map. They demonstrated that adaptive automation, which activated when operator performance
fell below a threshold, improved SA and change detection while lowering mental workload.
Figure 5 depicts the results of the simulation (Parasuraman, Barnes, & Cosenzo, 2007).

Figure 5 - Effects of Static and Adaptive Automation on Change Detection, SA, and Workload (Parasuraman, Barnes and
Cosenzo, 2007)

Cummings, et al. (2007) extended this concept to single operator, multi-UAV control.
They present a series of hierarchical control loops as shown in Figure 6, ranging from overall
mission management, through navigation, to actual flight control, with outer loops depending on
the correct functioning of the inner loops. Each of these loops requires different degrees of

1

Note that this model is consistent with the dominant military command and control paradigm of
Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. (Boyd, 1987)
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interaction with the operator. This necessitates a high degree of operator trust in the automation
in the inner loops, because a single operator can only monitor the piloting of multiple vehicles,
not control them manually. Previous studies show that if reliability decreased with more
vehicles present, trust declined. However, trust improved when the human operator was
involved in planning and executing decisions. Even perfectly reliable automation, though, could
not prevent a decrease in performance when workload increased (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, &
Mitchell, 2007).

Figure 6 - Hierarchical Control Loops (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007)

2.4.2 Display System Confidence
Context-aware systems may never attain 100% reliability since the context information
that is needed to drive these systems is often incomplete, inaccessible, and/or uncertain.
Therefore, the notion of trust between human operators and machines is necessary as operators
tend to rely on certain properties of automation and develop a set of expectations of performance
and behavior that can be greatly affected by the lack of a completely reliable system (Antifakos,
Kern, Schiele, & Schwaninger, 2005). Antifakos, et al. propose displaying system confidence in
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order to help the human predict the outcome of the system and to use the system more
effectively.
Antifakos et al. conducted a study to evaluate the effects of displaying system confidence
on the user’s trust towards a context-aware mobile phone. The study was conducted such that
participants were evaluated on how much they relied on the context-aware systems. Different
videos that varied in situation, criticality, and cue-availability, were presented to the participants
who were asked ‘In this situation, would you check the modality automatically selected by the
system’ and instructed to rate the question on a continuous scale from “no” to “yes”. In the
study, trust was measured by capturing how often the user would verify a modality the system
automatically derived (Antifakos, Kern, Schiele, & Schwaninger, 2005).
The results of the study demonstrated that system confidence had a statistical impact on
how the user relied upon the system. Figure 7 displays the results of the study. The graph
portrays that participants verified the setting made by the context-aware system less often when
the confidence of the system was medium or high. The verification rates tended to be higher
with low system confidence, indicating that people inherently assume a confidence of above 0.5
and thus felt the need to verify the system more (Antifakos, Kern, Schiele, & Schwaninger,
2005).
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Figure 7 - Antifakos, Kern, Schiele & Schwaninger, 2005

2.5 Train for Appropriate Trust
Training, another HSI domain, is vital in conditioning operators to appropriately rely
upon automation. As we have seen, operator trust in automation is largely based on expectations
about the automation’s ability, integrity, and benevolence. It is critically important, especially
when establishing initial trust (which depends primarily on predictability), that expectations be
defined realistically. This can be done through direct elicitation using various methods, such as
vignette framing. In vignette framing, simplified scenarios are presented to expose participants
to a particular situation or problem, and to elicit previously unstated expectations about the
automation to be used in the scenario. These expectations can then be addressed, confirmed or
adjusted as need be (Miller, 2008).
After initial expectations addressed, an operator must begin to interact with the system to
develop proficiency. During this early phase, training from more experienced users can
influence trust in the automation through social and organizational context, and direct experience
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will allow the operator to form an expectation of its reliability in various situations. This trust
will be context-specific because user expectations are reinforced or refuted in specific situations.
The operator’s tendency to rely on the automation, or to act on a trust decision, will be based on
uncertainty, time stress, and stakes.
Uncertainty refers to resolution, which in turn depends on the completeness of the user’s
understanding of system performance under given conditions. If training improves system
knowledge, it will reinforce appropriate trust and reduce the amount of time an operator spends
verifying the system (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998).
Time stress, as the name implies, is the pressure to act quickly. When time stress is high,
an operator will act quickly even when trust is uncertain. However, as discussed previously,
under high time stress a user may choose not to rely on automation even if it is trusted, if that
automation is too cumbersome to configure or engage. Training can improve this tendency, if
the operator becomes familiar enough with the automation to reduce configuration time (Cohen,
Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998).
Stakes are consequences of a mistake. These mistakes can be caused by either through
disuse by incorrectly rejecting the automation, or misuse by accepting a false recommendation.
As training improves an operator’s expectations of the system, trust should become more
appropriate and the tendency of these errors should be reduced (Cohen, Parasuraman, &
Freeman, 1998).
Training should account for the three dynamics of trust described in Section 2.2.3 as
Predictability, Dependability, and Faith. In doing so, training should represent realistic system
automation and operational scenarios. While designers and trainers cannot anticipate all possible
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situations an operator may face, experience with the system as close to its intended environment
as possible will develop realistic expectations and engender appropriate trust in automation.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
The literature review summarized in Chapter 2 provides a common frame of reference to
model trust and its relationship to reliance and mission effectiveness. However, the
multidisciplinary nature of trust and related concepts means that any trust model can be
interpreted and critiqued by various communities in many different ways. While several models
of trust have been proposed, these efforts have not produced a model that systems engineers can
directly apply to integrate trust into system architectures such as those depicted within the DoD
Architecture Framework, or DoDAF (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007).
The intent of this research is to develop a model that can inform and guide systems
engineering efforts through a deeper understanding of operator trust in automation, trust’s
influences, and trust’s effect on reliance decisions. A second objective is to apply that model to
an architecture for a specific purpose, namely UAV multi-mission management, to illustrate the
model’s utility in enhancing system design to improve mission effectiveness.
The resulting model is not intended to be understood from the perspective of an
individual operator. Rather, it is a depiction of part of the system's state at a given time, where
the operator is an integral part of the man/machine system. Thus, trust and other factors are
properties of the system as a whole. Using this model, a systems engineering team should be
able to make design decisions specifically to develop and maintain appropriate operator trust in
the automation. They will be able to consider trust explicitly when developing information
exchange and data requirements, and establish measures of performance and/or effectiveness to
evaluate the appropriateness of trust.
Practical application of the model requires an adaptation of techniques developed by
Majors Jonathan Zall and David O’Malley (2008) to incorporate cognition into the DoDAF.
Together, these concepts may improve future single-operator multi-UAV system designs by
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appropriately calibrating operator trust in automation. Increased trust will improve mission
effectiveness by reducing misuse and disuse of automation, allowing a more efficient distribution
of effort between human and machine.

3.1 Macro View of Trust Relationships
The diagram shown in Figure 8 is useful for graphically summarizing the trust
components and relationships. Context and operator perception combine to form expectation,
the primary inputs to trust. Trust, as discussed previously, is an attitude that influences the
reliance decision. However, factors external to trust may also influence reliance on automation
in certain situations: ease of use, operating procedures (which might also be considered part of
context), and likely others. A systems engineering model cannot include all possible influences
on reliance, and henceforth the model being developed will not depict influences unrelated to
trust. However, the readers should understand that trust, while an important factor, is not the
sole determinant of a reliance decision.

Figure 8 - Macro view of trust relationships
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Reliance also influences the outcome of a particular decision. Yet, as reliance may
depend on factors other than trust, the outcome of an event also can depend on factors external to
the reliance decision. Other human, machine, and perhaps natural actors (e.g. birds) in the
battlespace, differences between perception and ground truth, and other factors may also affect
the outcome. These factors will not be depicted in the trust model intended for application in the
systems engineering process. However, external factors can lead to a difference between
apparent predictability and inherent predictability, which can incorrectly affect trust as discussed
in section 2.2.3.1. Therefore, it is important for engineers and operators to evaluate whether
anomalous outcomes result from an incorrect reliance decision based on inappropriate trust, from
external factors, or from both.
It is particularly important during after-action analysis to determine when the operator
accepted automation inappropriately (misused) or rejected automation inappropriately (disused).
This information must be captured to the operator because achievement or failure of an expected
outcome becomes part of an operator’s context for future situations involving trust. When trust
is appropriate and automation is relied on correctly, achievement of an effective and suitable
outcome will reinforce that trust attitude. On the other hand, ineffectiveness may cause the
operator to reassess the level of trust in the automation.

3.2 Development of the SE Model of Trust
While the macro view is useful for understanding the relationships between expectation,
trust, reliance, and outcome, it has insufficient detail to be used when building systems
architectures. To provide the requisite detail to allow systems and software engineers to consider
trust explicitly within system architectures, the authors constructed a model using Unified
Modeling Language (UML) notation. This structure is appropriate for Systems Modeling
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Language (SysML) architectures also. The model will be described throughout the remainder of
this chapter.
The UML model enabled the depiction of trust-related elements as object classes with
associated attributes and methods. Attributes, depicted under the class name, are variables for
each object of that class possesses. Methods, depicted in the bottom partition of each class, can
be considered as functions performed by an object of that class. By depicting elements of the
trust relationship as UML classes, these human cognitive activities may be represented as “trust
objects” in architecture products. The UML classes may eventually provide linkages between
trust objects and hardware or software objects representing components of system automation.
3.2.1 Perception
Chapter 2 developed a framework of trust and its dependencies. One of the major
premises was that beliefs and perceptions are part of the information base that determines the
trust attitude and affects operator reliance (Lee & See, 2004). The major concepts discussed in
the literature were: situational awareness, self-confidence, time stress, and mental workload. For
purposes of the current research, these concepts were classified as operator perceptions. Figure 9
was constructed to portray this relationship.
Operator Perception

Situational Awareness

Mental Workload
-Resources

+Perceive()
+Comprehend()
+Project()
Self-Confidence

Time Stress

-Degree

-Cost of delay

Figure 9 - UML Class Hierarchy of Operator Perception
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Each of these perception constructs can be assessed empirically by designers to create
automation that complements operator capabilities. However, an operator will behave based on
their own mental model of each construct rather than objective measures of their own ability. By
applying the model presented throughout this chapter to architecture, the authors believe
designers will be able to shape operator perception to be more realistic to the automation’s actual
capabilities, as well as the operator’s own abilities.
3.2.2 Context
Lee and See (2004) developed a model depicting the interaction of varying contexts as
they relate to the evolution of trust: social, organizational, and individual. Bhattacharya,
et al. (1998) also describes the environment and its inherent uncertainty as a context for the trust
relationship. Those studies provided a basis for the UML diagram in Figure 10.
Context

Social

Organizational

-Norms
-Shared Experiences

-Reputation
-Roles

Individual

Situational

-Training
-Experience
-General Inclination

System State
-Transparency
-Predictability
+Adaptive Automation()

Environment
-Uncertainty
-Risk

Figure 10 - UML Class Hierarchy of Context
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In the class Individual, the following attributes were added: Training, Experience, and
General Inclination. General inclination was defined as the inherent propensity to trust that
varies across individuals. Therefore, this notion is an attribute specific to the subclass
Individual. Likewise, training and experience with the system and automation are individualspecific properties, and therefore attributes of this subclass.
This research effort classified Environment and System State as subclasses of Situational
Context. As outlined in Chapter 2, uncertainty is one of the main drivers for the need for trust
where situational context plays a major role. Environments (considering both operational and
local) constantly change during missions and the uncertainty and riskiness of the environment at
any given point in time will ultimately impact an operator’s trust in the automation.
Likewise, the current state of the system is situation dependent and must be consistent
with the current needs of the operator. Otherwise, the system will not perform as expected, thus
affecting the trust relationship. Transparency is defined as the amount of knowledge an operator
has about why the automation performs as it does. The relationship between transparency and
trust is not linear and therefore system planners must implement appropriate training to provide
operators a degree of transparency, which can improve the accuracy of their expectations of
system performance. However, appropriate transparency can also be designed into the system
itself. For example, Chapter 2 describes how adaptive automation adjusts to the needs of the
operator in a given situation, enhancing mission effectiveness by making the best use of
human/machine collaboration.
3.2.3 Interaction of perception and context
This research differentiated the concepts of context and operator perception based upon
their objective/subjective nature. Context refers to the objective components of the system and
its environment while operator perception encompasses the subjective measures. Operator
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perception and context are interconnected through the expectations that an operator forms based
upon the system context and the perceptions they develop in relation to the context and system
automation. Figure 11 was developed to demonstrate this relationship.
*

*

Operator Perception

Context

Expectation
Situational Awareness

Mental Workload

-Strength
-Importance

-Resources

Social

+Perceive()
+Comprehend()
+Project()

Organizational

-Norms
-Shared Experiences
Self-Confidence
-Degree

-Reputation
-Roles

Time Stress
-Cost of delay

Situational

Individual
-Training
-Experience
-General Inclination

System State
-Transparency
-Predictability
+Adaptive Automation()

Environment
-Uncertainty
-Risk

Figure 11 - Interaction of Perception, Context, and Trust

The various contexts and operator perceptions coalesce to develop a set of expectations
that influence the trust relationship. For example, different contexts and levels of selfconfidence will develop operator expectations on whether or not they feel they can operate better
with or without system automation. In addition, situational context and operator perceptions will
form a set of expectations on the level of operator input and control that is needed. For example,
an operator flying a time-sensitive-target mission must deal with a rapidly changing environment
in which his expectations may be biased toward anticipating events and acting decisively. This
will likely cause him to operate the system differently than if he was conducting routine
surveillance of stationary targets, in which the operator may expect the situation to be relatively
stable, and any change that occurs need only be noted and not immediately acted upon. This
example portrays the attribute of importance in the expectations that are developed, as where the
prior example highlights the utility of the strength attribute of expectations. It also demonstrates
the interplay of context and perception, in this case situational context and time stress.
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3.2.4 Trust
Operator perceptions and context interact to form expectations. Expectations, in turn,
form the primary inputs to trust. The UML diagram in Figure 12 demonstrates these
interactions.
*

*

Operator Perception

Context

Expectation
Situational Awareness

Mental Workload

-Strength
-Importance

-Resources

Social

+Perceive()
+Comprehend()
+Project()

Organizational

-Norms
-Shared Experiences

-Reputation
-Roles

/ Affects
Self-Confidence
-Degree

Time Stress
-Cost of delay

Situational

Trust
-Technical Competence
-Persistence
-Fiduciary Responsibility
+Predict()
+Depend()
+Believe()

Individual
-Training
-Experience
-General Inclination

System State

Environment

-Transparency
-Predictability
+Adaptive Automation()

-Uncertainty
-Risk

Figure 12 - Interaction of trust, perception, context and expectations

These relationships are consistent with Bhattacharya, et al.’s (1998) research, which
determined that trust is formed in part by expectations, as well as Lee and See’s work that
portrayed context and perceptions as elements to evolution of trust.

In addition, Lee and See

characterized trust as an attitude to differentiate trust from the inputs of belief and information
that form trust (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998); (Lee & See, 2004).
Muir’s trust bases, Technical Competence, Persistence, and Fiduciary Responsibility,
provided the foundation of attributes for the class as they are the inherent characteristics that
define the multidimensional nature of trust. In addition, Lee and See’s (2004) dynamics of trust,
Predictability, Dependability, and Faith (identified here as Believe), act as the three fundamental
methods, or stages, that an operator can have in his/her trust relationship (Muir, 1994).
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3.2.5 Reliance Decision and its Outcome
An operator’s trust in a system will be one of the main inputs into the decision of whether
or not to rely on the system. The literature review in Chapter 2 defined three factors that result
from the trust-reliance relationship. These were added as the main attributes of reliance:
Calibration, Resolution, and Specificity. As described in Chapter 2, the goal for system planners
is to design a system that fosters good calibration, high resolution, and high specificity. Varying
levels of these attributes will lead an operator either to Use, Misuse, or Disuse the system. These
are the three methods of reliance, where Use implies appropriate reliance, Misuse implies
overreliance, and Disuse implies underreliance. These factors thus represent the outcomes of the
reliance decision, as depicted in Figure 13.

Figure 13 - Reliance Decision Tree

In Figure 13, D represents the reliance decision (i.e. accept or reject automation). Circles
labeled E represent the operator’s expectation of the automation’s capability. As previously
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discussed, expectation has some degree of strength, shown as a probability p. Circles labeled A
represent the actual capability of the automation, with some probability q that it is actually
correct. In this model, it could be argued that the difference between expected capability p and
actual capability q relates to the calibration of trust. Given the expected and actual capability,
the possible outcomes of the reliance decision are represented as triangles. In forming
expectations about possible outcomes, the operator will have mentally assigned each foreseeable
outcome a value, although that value is often subjective. Shown here as U(Oi) (where i
represents the set of all foreseeable outcomes,) this value represents the utility, or importance, to
the operator of achieving outcome Oi.
The utility of the actual outcome achieved, compared to the utility of the expected
outcome, will shape the operator’s future expectations and will ultimately affect the trust
attitude. In other words, the degree to which the actual outcome matches the operator's
expectation will affect the individual, situational, and/or organizational context for future
iterations of this model. This change of context will reinforce or alter expectations and trust.
3.2.6 Integrated Model of Trust
In summary, this research effort combined all of the above concepts related to trust and
reliance to develop the integrated model shown in Figure 14.
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*

*

Operator Perception

Context

Expectation
Situational Awareness

Mental Workload

-Strength
-Importance

-Resources

Organizational

Social

+Perceive()
+Comprehend()
+Project()

-Reputation
-Roles

-Norms
-Shared Experiences
/ Affects
Self-Confidence
-Degree

Time Stress

/ Affects

-Cost of delay

Situational

Trust
-Technical Competence
-Persistence
-Fiduciary Responsibility
+Predict()
+Depend()
+Believe()
/ Influences

Individual
-Training
-Experience
-General Inclination

System State
-Transparency
-Predictability
+Adaptive Automation()

Environment
-Uncertainty
-Risk

Reliance
-Calibration
-Resolution
-Specificity
+Misuse()
+Disuse()
+Use()

/ Affects

/ Influences

Outcome
-Effectiveness
-Suitability

Figure 14 - SE Model of Trust Relationships

The main intent of this research is to provide a means of architecting trust early in
system design in order to develop systems that will increase mission effectiveness. Therefore,
effectiveness and suitability are the main attributes of the class Outcome. These measures
develop the foundation for a user to evaluate the appropriateness of their trust in the system. As
a whole, this model serves as a guide to explicitly address trust within system architectures.
Architectures can be developed in many ways, but those of relevance to military planners
generally follow the DoD Architecture Framework, or DoDAF.

3.3 DoD Architecture Framework
3.3.1 Application of Trust Model to System Architecture
The trust model described in this chapter is derived from a large body of work by
researchers in human factors, psychology, human systems integration, and other related
disciplines. The model is intended to aid systems engineers to improve the effectiveness of
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system design by considering trust relationships and their related tasks, information
requirements, and processes explicitly during architecture development. Therefore, the model is
in line with the HSI community’s emphasis to integrate human capabilities into system design
beginning with conceptualization and continuing through system disposal. In order to do so, the
trust model must be applicable to existing architecture frameworks, both at the conceptual level
and as elements of specific products. This integration will be discussed in the next chapter.
3.3.2 DoDAF v1.5
The DoD Architecture Framework “provides the guidance and rules for developing,
representing, and understanding architectures based on a common denominator across DoD,
Joint, and multinational boundaries.” DoDAF version 1.5 consists of four types of views:
Operational View (OV), Systems and Services View (SV), Technical Standards View (TV), and
All View. Applied correctly, these views form an integrated architecture, which means that the
different views are not independent representations of separate parts of the system. Rather,
“architecture data elements are uniquely identified and consistently used across all products and
views within the architecture” (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007). The individual views, then, are
different ways to represent aspects of the system in order for members of interdisciplinary
subsystem engineering teams to integrate their components with the overall effort.
The OV mainly represents the different tasks and activities that the system performs
along with operational nodes and the associated information exchanges. In accomplishing this
representation, the views are designed to convey the types of information exchanged, the
frequency of exchange, the tasks and activities supported by the information exchange, and the
nature of the information exchanges. The SV is designed to portray the system, service, and
interconnection functionality providing for, or supporting operational activities. Therefore,

44

many aspects of the systems views are linked back to artifacts with the operational views. The
TVs are comprised of a set of rules that provide the necessary framework to establish
engineering guidelines and product lines to ensure the system is built to satisfy the specified set
of operational requirements. The AV is designed to establish the scope and context of the
architecture. The AV is comprised of the overarching aspects that relate to all three views
including products such as vision statements, CONOPS, scenarios, etc. (DoDAF Version 1.5,
2007). The major relationships among the types of views are illustrated in Figure 15 below.

Figure 15 - Fundamental Linkages Among the Views, DoDAF v1.5 Vol. 2

In all, there are 28 distinct views that define the system, its components, and their
interactions. The applicable views, their product name, and a brief description of each are
outlined in Table 1.
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Table 1 - List of Views in DoDAF v1.5

Applicable
View
All View
All View

Framework
Product
AV-1
AV-2

Operational

OV-5

OV-6a

Operational Rules
Model

OV-6b

Operational State
Transition Description

OV-6c

Operational EventTrace Description

OV-2

Operational
OV-3
Operational

Overview and
Summary Information
Integrated Dictionary
High-Level
Operational Concept
Graphic
Operational Node
Connectivity
Operational
Information Exchange
Matrix
Organizational
Relationships Chart
Operational Activity
Model

OV-1
Operational

Framework Product
Name

OV-4

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Logical Data Model
OV-7

Scope, purpose, intended users, environment depicted,
analytical findings
Architecture data repository with definitions of all terms
used in products
High-level graphical/textual description of operational
concept
Operational nodes, connectivity, and information
exchange need lines between nodes
Information exchanged between nodes and the relevant
attributes of that exchange
Organizational, role, or other relationships among
organizations
Capabilities, operational activities, relationships among
activities, inputs, and outputs; overlays can show cost,
performing nodes, or other pertinent information
One of three products used to describe operational
activity—identifies business rules that constrain
operation
One of three products used to describe operational
activity—identifies business process responses to
events
One of three products used to describe operational
activity—traces actions in a scenario or sequence of
events
Documentation of the system data requirements and
structural business process rules of the Operational
View
Identification of systems nodes, systems, system items,
services, and service items and their interconnections,
within and between nodes

Systems and
Services

SV-1

Systems and
Services

SV-2

Systems and Services
Communications
Description

Systems nodes, systems, system items, services, and
service items and their related communications
laydowns

SV-3

Systems-Systems/
Services-Systems/
Services-Services
Matrix

Relationships among systems and services in a given
architecture; can be designed to show relationships of
interest, e.g., system-type interfaces, planned vs.
existing interfaces, etc.

Systems Functionality
Description
Services Functionality
Description
Operational Activity to
Systems Function
Traceability Matrix

Functions performed by systems and the system data
flows among system functions
Functions performed by services and the service data
flow among service functions
Mapping of system functions back to operational
activities

Systems and
Services

Systems and
Services
Systems and
Services
Systems and
Services

SV-4a
SV-4b
SV-5a

Systems and Services
Interface Description

General Description

46

Framework
Product

Framework Product
Name

Systems and
Services

SV-5b

Operational Activity to
Systems Traceability
Matrix

Mapping of systems back to capabilities or operational
activities

Systems and
Services

Operational Activity to
Services Traceability
Matrix

Mapping of services back to operational activities

SV-5c

Systems and Services
Data Exchange Matrix

Provides details of system or service data elements
being exchanged between systems or services and the
attributes of that exchange

Systems and Services
Performance
Parameters Matrix

Performance characteristics of Systems and Services
View elements for the appropriate time frame(s)

Systems and Services
Evolution Description

Planned incremental steps toward migrating a suite of
systems or services to a more efficient suite, or toward
evolving a current system to a future implementation

Systems and Services
Technology Forecast

Emerging technologies and software/hardware products
that are expected to be available in a given set of time
frames and that will affect future development of the
architecture
One of three products used to describe system and
service functionality—identifies constraints that are
imposed on systems/services functionality due to some
aspect of systems design or implementation

Applicable
View

Systems and
Services

SV-6

Systems and
Services

SV-7

Systems and
Services

SV-8

Systems and
Services

SV-9

Systems and
Services

Systems and Services
Rules Model
SV-10a

Systems and
Services
Systems and
Services

Technical
Standards
Technical
Standards

SV-10b

SV-10c

TV-1
TV-2

General Description

Systems and Services
State Transition
Description

One of three products used to describe system and
service functionality—identifies responses of a
system/service to events

Systems and Services
Event-Trace
Description

One of three products used to describe system or
service functionality—identifies system/service-specific
refinements of critical sequences of events described in
the Operational View

Technical Standards
Profile
Technical Standards
Forecast

Listing of standards that apply to Systems and Services
View elements in a given architecture
Description of emerging standards and potential impact
on current Systems and Services View elements, within
a set of time frames

3.3.3 DoDAF v2.0
The draft DoDAF version 2.0 (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008) adds additional types of
views, but emphasizes the architecture process rather than the generation of specific products.
V2.0 describes its focus as follows: "The central core of DoDAF v2.0 is a data-centric approach
where the creation of architectures to support decision-making is secondary to the collection,
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storage, and maintenance of data needed for efficient and effective decisions. The architect and
stakeholders select views to ensure that architectures will explain current and future states of the
process or activity under review" (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008). Accordingly, further discussion
of system architecture in this research will concentrate on process rather than specific products,
although products may be used to illustrate important points. For reference, Figure 16
demonstrates the evolution of DoDAF views in version 2.0 and provides a mapping of DoDAF
v1.5 views to the new framework.

Figure 16 - Notional Mapping of DoDAF v1.5 Views to Draft DoDAF 2.0 Views
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3.4 Zall/O’Malley Model
3.4.1 Architecting Cognition
Research conducted by Zall and O’Malley (2008) focused on integrating human
cognition into DoD systems architecture. They identified five pertinent areas of cognition that
provided the foundation for early system trades, and manpower, personnel, and training (MPT)
decisions. These five areas are: Cognitive Tasks, Cognitive Inputs, Cognitive Outputs, Cognitive
Roles, and Cognitive Environments (Zall & O'Malley, 2008).
One of the main drivers behind Zall and O’Malley’s research was the development of
cognitive tasks (an identification of which type of cognition is required) and allocation of the
task to either human or machine; i.e. either cognitive or pseudo-cognitive (CPC) tasks. These
allocations in early architecture provide the framework for system developers and planners to
better understand and incorporate varying levels of automation and human supervisory control
into systems.
Cognitive inputs are the specific information that the cognitive tasks require to be
completed while the cognitive output is the consequential set of information that results from the
cognitive task (Zall & O'Malley, 2008). These two types of information can depict the necessary
enabling items and system complexity when outlined in the system’s architecture to aid the
developer/planner in identifying and avoiding potential HSI shortfalls.
The cognitive role evolves from a specified set of cognitive tasks and is intended to take
on a specific personnel position description to help define MPT system requirements (Zall &
O'Malley, 2008). The premise of architecting this aspect is to ensure that personnel are utilized
to their maximum potential and are not under/over utilized by allocating too few/many cognitive
tasks to the specific cognitive role an operator will fill.
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Lastly, architecting the cognitive environment provides a necessary representation of the
interactions different roles and entities will have on one another. In addition, the cognitive
environment presents an opportunity to account for any design related constraints that MPT
requirements may place on the system such as whether or not an operator has enough space to
properly work.
3.4.2 Fundamental CPC Tasks
Zall and O’Malley used an atomic approach to decompose the many cognitive task types
into a smaller set of fundamental tasks or “bases” that can be combined to form any type of
cognitive activity. These bases are outlined in Table 2.
Table 2 - Early Conceptual Design Eight Fundamental CPC Tasks (Zall & O'Malley, 2008)

The focus of their research was to integrate these elements of cognition into existing
DoDAF products. Because the cognitive tasks primarily represent activities, Zall and O’Malley
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(2008) focused their efforts on expanding OV-5 activity diagrams to include all activities down
to the cognitive level. This process was developed to help identify the cognitive tasks in a
system and assist engineers in allocating these tasks to either human or machine.

3.5 Architecting for Appropriate Trust
As previously described, the trust relationship includes activities and data elements.
Thus, while the techniques developed by Zall & O'Malley (2008) provide a starting point from
which to architect trust, they are insufficient to encapsulate the full trust relationship due to their
focus on activities. Therefore, in addition to developing objects within the architecture views,
the various trust dependencies will be evaluated as data elements and information exchanges
identified during the architecture process.
To determine methods for architecting trust, it is necessary to evaluate a host of views
from a particular framework. In accomplishing this task, DoDAF version 1.5 architecture
products will be used; however, it is necessary to reiterate that the application of a process, not
the generation of products, is the enduring goal of this research. The primary focus will be to
develop a strategy to aid systems engineers and planners in considering the trust relationship in
system design. This emphasis on process, rather than products, will be consistent with DoDAF
version 2.0.
The final portion of our research will evaluate the architecture products associated with a
particular developmental UAS. The goal of this evaluation is to demonstrate a strategy that can
be applied to any type of system within any architecture framework which will provide
maximum applicability for systems engineers.
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Chapter 4: Process for Integrating Trust Within DoDAF
4.1 The DoDAF Architecture Process
The integration of trust into system architecture should not be an afterthought or
corrective action, but rather should occur throughout the architecture development process.
Accordingly, the basic processes for integrating trust will coincide with those of the larger
architecture effort. DoDAF v2.0 describes a six-step architecture development process, as
follows (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008).
Step 1: Determine Intended Use of Architecture. In this step, the architect defines the
purpose and intended use of the architecture, and establishes the architecture strategy for the
project. This is generally based on information provided by the process owner.
Step 2: Determine Scope of Architecture. Scope refers to the depth and breadth of the
architecture. In this step, the architecture's problem set and context are defined, and the architect
begins to define the level of detail required for the architecture content. It is important for the
architect to define a clear and appropriate scope that enables an expected result but avoids
excessive breadth. For example, often only the manmade system components are addressed.
Step 3: Determine Data Required to Support Architecture Development. The scope
defined in step 2 influences the level of detail needed for each data entity and attribute. Here,
data refers to both the information needed for execution of the process, and other data needed to
produce the desired process changes (e.g. documentation about the architecture effort itself.) The
data content is recorded as attributes, associations, and concepts that will later be mapped to
specific architecture views as needed.
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Step 4: Collect, Organize, Correlate, and Store Architecture Data. In this step,
architects collect and organize data in order to develop a structure for the overall architecture
effort. The data are organized into a taxonomy that allows identification of data gaps, as well as
process and services required.
Step 5: Conduct analyses in support of architecture objectives. This step prepares the
architecture for approval by the process owner by validating the architecture effort against
established process owner requirements. If changes are required from the validation process, they
are made by iterating steps 3 through 5 as necessary.
Step 6: Document Results in Accordance with Architecture Framework. The final
step involves the creation of actual architecture views as needed, based on the underlying data
developed in the previous steps. DoDAF v2.0 provides a number of predefined “DoDAFdescribed Views”, including many of those contained in DoDAF v1.5 and similar frameworks.
The DoDAF does not require specific views to be used, but encourages architects to use DoDAFdefined views where applicable. However, DoDAF v2.0 also provides user-defined views, or
'Fit-for-purpose Views', which can be created in non-standard formats as long as they are
consistent with the DoDAF meta-model. This allows architects to tailor products to their
specific project or organization, or to support their key decision-maker.

4.2 Architecture Methodologies
The execution of the six-step architecture development process requires the use of
analytical techniques to organize and portray system elements. These generally fall into two
classes of approaches: Structured Analysis and Object-Oriented Analysis.
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Structured Analysis is a process-oriented approach that centers on hierarchical
decomposition of processes, along with corresponding inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms
(ICOMs). Structured Analyses may result in process data flow diagrams, which allow users to
visualize how specific data inputs trace to given actions; process task-dependency diagrams,
which depict the flow of material, information, or a service through all its steps in a logical or
required order; and entity-relation models, which describe the structure of system domain data
types and the rules that govern system data (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008).
Object-Oriented Analysis (OOA), describes the operational use cases, places data in the
context in which it will be used, and provides traceability for system and software design. OOA
consists of activity diagrams, which depict dynamic system behavior; class and object diagrams,
which portray sets of objects (i.e. performers) and their relationships as classes (object types).
Another useful diagram in Object Oriented Analyses is the sequence diagram, showing the
temporal changing nature of interacting objects (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008).
These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and integrated architectures often will
make use of both techniques, manifested in different views to demonstrate various aspects of the
system. The trust model developed in Chapter 3 is applicable within both techniques, depending
on the purposes for which it is needed in specific parts of the architecture process.

4.3 Architecting Trust
The emphasis on process, rather than products, in DoDAF v2.0 provides a standard
framework within which to develop system architectures, while allowing system architects
flexibility in creating the architecture itself. When considering trust within the framework, the
six steps of the DoDAF process can be paired into three stages: Determine Scope and View;
Determine and Organize the Data; and Analyze and Document Results. Portions of the trust
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model developed in chapter 3 can be applied during each of these stages, as will be described
throughout the remainder of this section. In addition, the authors have prepared a summary of
this section as a quick reference guide for system architects and technical managers. This
summary can be found as Appendix A.
4.3.1 Determine Scope and View
The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) (Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2007) process provides system planners with a high level view of the requirements needed to
fulfill an existing gap in the Department of Defense. As a new system enters into the formal
acquisition process, systems engineers and planners have a basic understanding of the
requirements that are needed to fulfill the gap; however, few system-specific details exist at this
stage in the process. This overarching JCIDS view of the required capability provides systems
engineers and planners a basis to begin to consider the relationships that arise in system design
and then begin to plan for incorporating trust into the human-system relationships.
Within the current architecture framework, the main views present at this stage would be
the AV-1 Overview and Summary Information, and the OV-1 High-Level Operational Concept
Graphic. These views provide planners with graphical and textual representations of how the
system will be implemented. The architect can begin to incorporate trust using these views by
determining how and where an operator may interact with the system. These interactions form
the foundation of the trust relationship. By identifying the foundation of the trust relationship,
the architect should be able to focus subsequent development efforts where they will most
improve trust. In addition, the AV-1 provides insight into the nature of the expected operational
environment of the system. The operational conditions are important in establishing the
situational context portion of the trust model. Likewise, the uncertainty and risk inherent in the
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operational environment are key factors in establishing operator expectations, which will drive
the trust relationship between the operator and the automation.
Also within this stage, planners should consider the manpower, personnel, and training
(MPT) requirements needed to operate the system. By shaping MPT requirements early in the
development process, planners can account for the influence of organizational context (e.g.
command structure, roles) and individual context (e.g. training, familiarity with a given interface)
of their intended user, rather than reacting to the influences post hoc.
Knowledge of context may affect design decisions, or a specific design implementation
may inspire changes to training. In either case, early architecture steps are useful to begin to
determine scenarios where operator trust in automation will be particularly important and to
define corresponding design requirements to foster appropriate trust within those operating
scenarios.
4.3.2 Determine and Organize the Data
System architects focus much effort on determining and collecting data elements
necessary to define roles and activities within the system. Determining and collecting data
elements allows planners to apply the trust lens, by determining which trust bases and
dependencies are relevant within the system, under what scenarios they are critical, and how to
effectively integrate and portray the elements.
During the determination and collection of data steps, architects should focus on
providing transparency of the system’s state to the operator in a manner that allows operators to
form accurate expectations, and then reinforce appropriate trust. This might be accomplished by
displaying confidence information about automated functions (Antifakos, Kern, Schiele, &
Schwaninger, 2005); (Jamieson, Wang, & Neyedli, 2008) by adapting the behavior of
automation in order to account for operator perceptions, like SA or mental workload (Cummings
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& Mitchell, 2008); (Parasuraman, Barnes, & Cosenzo, 2007), or other implementation-specific
means. As the system architecture is developed and refined, architects can account for trust
while establishing specific operating scenarios and making design decisions.
There are four main categories of architecture views that systems engineers and architects
will be concerned with: functional/behavioral, informational, sequence/temporal, and structural.
Each of these categories allows system architects to portray different aspects of the trust
relationships within their system.
4.3.2.1 Functional / Behavioral
Functionally decomposing a system will allow planners and designers to obtain a more
in-depth understanding of the tasks the system will perform and the human and machine system
nodes that are essential in accomplishing them. Information exchanges between system nodes
directly impact certain trust dependencies and therefore must be accounted for during system
design. For example, knowledge of the system state (e.g. system transparency) will facilitate
more appropriate operator-automation trust if the underlying data is displayed effectively
(Konstantinou, Liagkou, Spirakis, Stamatiou, & Yung, 2005).
In addition, an understanding of the inputs, controls, outputs, and mechanisms (ICOMs)
that drive system activities will be pertinent in the creation and/or modification of data elements
that will aid designers in architecting for appropriate trust. For example, one of the
recommendations from earlier research detailed in Chapter 2 was to display system confidence to
the operator (Antifakos, Kern, Schiele, & Schwaninger, 2005). This activity may require the
addition of a new task with new information exchanges between system components.
Two of the main views in DoDAF v1.5 that focus on functional elements are the OV-5
Operational Activity Model, and the SV-4 Systems Functionality Description. The OV-5
portrays activities and the ICOMs that relate to them. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Zall and
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O’Malley (2008) outlined a process to incorporate fundamental cognitive tasks in OV-5
diagrams. Their main focus was to enhance the views in relation to the MPT requirements by
adding ICOMs and tasks, and classifying them as cognitive (human) or pseudo-cognitive
(machine). The differentiation of cognitive and pseudo-cognitive tasks with ICOMs implies
interaction between human operators and automation, and thus the presence of trust relationships
that need to be considered during architecture development. In addition, as Zall and O'Malley
discussed, the allocation of cognitive and pseudo-cognitive tasks provides a basis to develop
tailored training that enhances relationships between actors in the system. This training could
develop and/or reinforce the individual context component of the trust model, and could provide
input to allow the operator to form expectations of the system's behavior under realistic
operational conditions.
4.3.2.2 Informational
Portrayals of system information exchanges are increasingly important in the
architectures of complex systems. Since trust is inherently dependent on the information the
trustor has about the trustee, the environment, etc., the depiction of informational flows in the
system will be particularly relevant to trust. Consideration of elements such as situational
context may necessitate additional information flows, due to their effect on forming and
reinforcing operator expectations, trust, and reliance.
Informational elements typically are depicted in views such as the SV-6 Data Exchange
Matrix, which "specifies the characteristics of the system data exchanged between systems. This
product focuses on automated information exchanges that are implemented in systems" (DoDAF
Version 1.5, 2007). Likewise, the OV-7 Logical Data Model "describes the structure of an
architecture domain’s system data types and the structural business process rules that govern the
system data" (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007).
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4.3.2.3 Sequence / Temporal
The development of time-phased portrayals of the system activities provides the
foundation for engineers to determine the desired dynamics and level of trust for anticipated
situations. In essence, sequence diagrams will foster the development of the type and level of
automation that is most effective for the different scenarios and environments that the system
will be expected to operate in. As anticipated events and desired outcomes are outlined in given
scenarios, the criticality and time stress of each can be assessed in order to design proper
automation.
The information derived from sequence diagrams will provide the basis for designers to
evaluate where and when to use adaptive automation as outlined in Chapter 2. This type of
automation will be imperative in some highly critical and time stressed situations where operator
faith in the automation is necessary to accomplish the objectives. In addition, planners can
utilize this information to build their training scenarios in order to provide realistic operator
experience, which will improve the operator’s ability to predict system behavior and reinforce
realistic expectations about the system’s dependability.
The main DoDAF views that depict sequence information are the OV-6c Operational
Event-Trace Description, and the SV-10c Systems Event-Trace Description. The OV-6c is a
time-phased portrayal of the operational activities to accomplish a mission, while the SV-10c
captures the changing system state over time including the data exchanges that occur between
system components. Additional data exchanges such as the receipt and acknowledgement of a
command directly following an operator command will likely result in an enhancement in the
relationship between the operator and automation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the workload of
current Global Hawk operators is unnecessarily increased due to the need to check system
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responses to ensure the automation received the command. Additional information exchanges
would alleviate this problem and help foster the transition to one operator multiple UAS systems.
4.3.2.4 Structural
An understanding of all the subsystems that comprise the overall system and their
interfaces will provide the information necessary to visualize the interconnections and their
relationships. One of the main goals of the Human Factors Engineering domain within the HSI
community is to create effective integration of human-system interfaces to achieve optimal total
system performance (INCOSE, August 2007). These elements portray automation, the human,
and what relationships exist between them. With respect to trust, knowledge of system
interdependence is paramount in determining whether or not additional interfaces are needed to
facilitate the trust relationship. For example, to provide verification of commands and display
system confidence, the systems that provide information must interface with each other. In
addition, as illustrated in the trust model developed in chapter 3, the operator's knowledge of the
system state, combined with perceptions such as SA, affect trust by influencing expectations
about the system's predictability and dependability.
The architecture views that contain structural type of information are the SV-1 Systems
Interface Description and the SV-3 Systems-Systems, Services-Systems, Services-Services
Matrices. The SV-1 provides a view of all the systems and services and their interconnections,
while the SV-3 details the relationships and interfaces between the systems and services. Any
tasks, activities or system functions that were added to the OV-5, SV-4, OV-6c, SV-10c, etc. to
reflect trust relationships must be accounted for in the SV-1 and SV-3.
4.3.3 Analyze and Document Results
The last two steps in the architecture development process seek to validate the output of
the previous steps and to create architecture products based on the validated data. It is important
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to note that the data requirements definition, data gathering, analysis (validation), and
documentation (product generation) steps are iterative processes. As the system architecture
matures, relationships between system nodes may change, which may require reassessment of
the activities and information exchanges required to support appropriate operator-automation
trust.

4.4 Practical Application of the Trust Lens
A conceptual look at a trust-integrated architecture development process illustrates that it
is possible to address trust explicitly within system architectures. By doing so, engineers may
affect changes to system design to reinforce innate trust relationships, and theoretically, raise
overall system effectiveness by shaping the operator's trust in automation in ways that improve
the speed and accuracy of man/machine collaboration. Moreover, this can be done regardless of
the actual architecture framework employed or specific products used to define it.
However, a theoretical examination of the architecture development process cannot
demonstrate these conclusions definitively. To do so, it is necessary to examine the architecture
of a real world system, apply the trust integration process described, and assess the results for
indicators of improved system effectiveness. This research will now apply the theoretical study
to the Battlefield Airman Tactical Camera (BATCAM) UAS.
4.4.1 Intro to BATCAM/CUSS Architecture
The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is currently conducting research in
multiple UAS areas. Several current masters’ students at AFIT are conducting research in CUSS
to optimize control of multiple UAVs for varying tasks including, but not limited to: formation
manipulation, optimization of coverage area, flight path deconfliction, and sensor placement
optimization. The platform being used for this research is the BATCAM UAS. This ongoing
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research provides opportunity for the current authors to apply the trust relationships to an
existing UAS infrastructure.
4.4.1.1 System Overview
The BATCAM UAS consists of a hand launched air vehicle that uses GPS and autopilot
algorithms for navigation and landing, with commands (e.g. waypoints, altitude, etc.) uploaded
from a ground control station using a PC-based interface. Sensor data is downloaded to the same
control station. The air vehicle is 61cm in length, has a 53cm wingspan and weighs
approximately 0.38kg. Its size and weight support man portable backpack operations. The
BATCAM’s operations are limited due to its size, with a ceiling of 300m, a range of 3km and an
endurance of 18 minutes. The vehicle carries forward and side looking cameras in a removable
pod to provide real-time situational awareness and targeting information to the operator. The
system was developed by the Munitions Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratories and
has been in inventory since 2003. Figure 17 shows the BATCAM air vehicle. (Parsch, 2005)

Figure 17 - BATCAM UAV (Parsch, 2005)

Cummings, et al. (2007) developed a set of hierarchical control loops to describe a set of
basic mission functions UASs must perform (see Figure 6 in this document.) Currently, the
BATCAM operators are involved in Mission & Payload Management, Navigation, and to some
degree the Pilot functions. However, due to lack of reliable automation there is high demand
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upon the operator to maintain SA and verify that the air vehicle is performing as expected. To
decrease operator workload and facilitate a transition to a "one operator, multiple UAS system,"
a high degree of trust must be established between the operator and system automation. This gap
may present an opportunity for the current authors to apply the trust concepts outlined in the
beginning of this chapter.
4.4.1.2 Autopilot
The BATCAM UAV uses the Kestrel autopilot system, provided by Procerus
Technologies. Procerus offers the OnPoint software for use with the Kestrel. OnPoint is a targettracking program capable of providing geo-referenced track data for stationary and moving
target. (Procerus Technologies, 2006)

Figure 18 - Autopilot System (Procerus Technologies, 2006)

4.4.1.3 Ground Station
Two components which comprise the ground station: the Ground Control Unit (GCU)
and the Portable Computing Device (PCD). The BATCAM uses a single GCU which integrates
an RF modem, video receiver, and analog to digital video converter. Analysis of the GCU
revealed little internal coupling between these three components, with integration providing only
a single form factor. (Sakryd & Ericson, 2008)
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Figure 19 - Ground Control Unit (Sakryd & Ericson, 2008)

The PCD is the computing device which integrates most of the system’s functionality.
The BATCAM uses a Panasonic Tough Book™ which has been ruggedized for field use.
(Sakryd & Ericson, 2008)

Figure 20 - Portable Computing Device (Sakryd & Ericson, 2008)

4.4.1.4 Operations and Employment Concept
The BATCAM UAS primary employment include the following scenarios survey a
stationary target, survey a moving target, reconnoiter ahead of a moving vehicle, provide
surveillance of a series of waypoints, conduct a broad area search, and conduct search for a
target.

Each of these scenarios envisions employment of up to four UAVs operating

cooperatively to perform the assigned mission, controlled by a single operator. This research
will limit its focus to the following BATCAM operations: surveying a stationary target and
providing surveillance of a series of waypoints.
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4.4.1.4.1 Surveil a Stationary Target BATCAM Operational Process
A user wishes to surveil a stationary target. The user deploys the system if it is not
already in use. The user inputs the location of the target into GCU. The GCU directs one or
more UAVs to the target location. The UAVs transmit sensor data to the user. Upon reaching
the specified location, the UAVs execute a “loiter” flight pattern to provide sensor coverage on
the target. The user designates the target on his sensor monitoring screen. The UAVs maintain
sensor coverage of the target. At the end of the mission, the UAVs return to their previous task
or to their launching base.
The stationary target scenario may also be entered from another surveillance task. The
user monitoring a UAV sensor feed identifies a fleeting target of further interest. The user
directs the system to monitor the target. The UAV transitions to a “loiter” flight pattern around
the selected target.
The user may change the default loiter distance to try to get better sensor resolution on
the target or to minimize the chance of detection of the UAV.
4.4.1.4.2 Provide Surveillance of a Series of Waypoints BATCAM Operational Process
A user wishes to provide surveillance of a series of waypoints, such as a road, route,
perimeter, maritime transit lane, or geographic border, usually to provide sensor coverage ahead
of a convoy. The user deploys the system if it not already in use. The user inputs the designated
waypoints with the GCU. The GCU directs the UAVs to initial waypoints. The system organizes
the coverage of the UAVs in accordance with the programmed waypoints. The surveillance
continues until the UAVs are recalled or redirected by the user.
This scenario may be entered from another surveillance task. The user detects a route
from a UAV sensor feed. The user uploads waypoint data with the GCU. The user commands
the corresponding UAV to follow the route.
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During the mission, if a user detects a point for further study, the user commands the
corresponding UAV to focus on that point. The UAV transitions to a “loiter” flight plan around
the selected target. The system redistributes the coverage ahead of the convoy among the
remaining UAVs. When the user directs the system to stop monitoring the target, the system
directs the UAV that was designated for the selected target back into formation ahead of the
convoy and redistributes coverage.
4.4.2 Architecting Trust: Determining BATCAM Purpose and Scope
The current thesis group working with the BATCAM focused their efforts on
categorizing and defining the system. The following diagram is an OV-1 that was developed to
illustrate the operational capability of the BATMCAM system.

OV-1: CUSS Operational Concept
SatCom

GPS

Airborne Control Unit

Communications
Relay

Small Unit

Ground Control
Unit

GPS Signal
CUSS Comms

Theater HQ

Forward
Operating Base

C2ISR Link

Figure 21: BATCAM Operational Concept
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Ground Control
Unit

Section 4.3.1 outlined how early system architecture products can help facilitate initial
recognition of where and how an operator may interact with system automation as well as the
different interfaces that potentially exist throughout the system. From this diagram, a system
architect can conclude that the interaction between an operator and the automation will occur at
the Ground Control Units (GCU), and that the system will interface with the environment at the
airframe and the GCU. The automation will be facilitated by the CUSS software and the
communication links between the GCUs, communications relay, and airframes. This illustration
also indicates additional interfaces such as: GPS – GCU, GPS – airframe, SatCom – GCU, and
SatCom - Theater Headquarters. The architect can use this data to direct early application of
trust dependencies to improve system performance through appropriate trust.
4.4.3 Trust Data Required to Support BATCAM Architecture Development
4.4.3.1 Functional/Behavioral
The functional/behavioral architecture views can also foster more appropriate reliance if
trust relationships are considered. The AFIT BATCAM research group has developed OV-5 and
SV-4 views that support this category. As outlined in Section 3.5.2.2, one of the main objectives
for the BATMCAM UAS is to provide surveillance of a series of waypoints. Figure 22 portrays
the main operational tasks that are required to fulfill this objective.
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Figure 22 - Provide Surveillance OV-5 Diagram

This is the initial OV-5 operational diagram that was developed to describe the Provide
Surveillance operational activity. It is necessary to add additional ICOMs to Figure 21 in order
to design the system for appropriate trust. Displaying system confidence and acknowledging
operator commands are two recommendations that were made in Section 4.3.2.1 that are
applicable to the BATCAM UAS and expected to induce more appropriate reliance. These two
tasks would be represented as outputs from the Manage UAVs task. Figure 23 shows the OV-5
updated to reflect these two trust factors.
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Figure 23: OV-5 Diagram with Trust Factors Added

In order to obtain a more in-depth understanding of where these tasks are derived from
and how they affect system design and architecture, it is necessary to functionally decompose the
system to the appropriate level. As the diagram above portrays, the outputs originate from the
task Manage UAVs. Figure 24 portrays the functionally decomposed task before the two trust
factors were included.
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Figure 24 - Manage UAVs OV-5 Activity Diagram

The two trust factors, Acknowledge Commands and Determine Confidence, were added
as new operational tasks under the Manage UAVs functional decomposition. The main input for
acknowledging commands is User Flight Commands. Therefore, this ICOM was added as an
input to the Acknowledge Commands task. The result of this task is the output Command
Received. In order to determine UAV confidence, many ICOMs are needed as inputs. The
authors of this research added the following ICOMs as input to the new task: UAV
Position/Velocity, UAV System Status, Reference Tracking Signal, Formation Position Error,
Calculate Winds, and UAV Orientation. Figure 25 portrays the OV-5 diagram with the addition
of the trust factors.
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Figure 25: Updated OV-5 Diagram with Trust Factors

The SV-4 diagrams depict the functions that are performed by systems captured in the
OV-5 diagrams. For an activity to be accomplished, a system must be charged with performing
the task or a part of the task. Therefore, the SV-4 Systems Functionality Description diagrams
must be updated to reflect changes in the OV-5 Operational Activity diagrams. Figure 26
represents the architecture before the trust factors were included.

71

2

1

Perf orm Airborne Control
Functions

Perf orm Ground Control
Functions

1.2

1.1

Perf orm Operator
Functions

1.1.1

1.1.2

Prov ide UAV
Control Inputs

1.3

Prov ide Sensor
Control Inputs

1.3.1

1.2.1

1.3.4

1.1.4

Monitor Mission
Execution

Prov ide Operator
Interf ace

1.3.2

Interf ace with
Ground
Transceiv er

Capture
Surv eillance Data

1.3.5

Generate
Surv eillance
Product

Perf orm Airborne
Transceiv er
Function

1.3.3

Prov ide
Electronic
C2ISR Interf ace

Interf ace with
Airborne
Transceiv er

2.1.2

Receiv e Aircraf t
Status Data

2.1.3

2.2.1

Receiv e Sensor
Status Data

Demodulate
Communications
Data

1.3.6

2.2.2
2.1.4

Demodulate
Communications
Data f rom UAVs

2.2

Perf orm Airborne
Control Unit
Functions

2.1.1

Modulate
Communications
Data f or UAVs

1.2.2
1.1.3

Prov ide Mission
Planning Inputs

2.1

Perf orm CUSS
Sof tware
Functions

Perf orm Ground
Transceiv er
Functions

Compute Mission
Plan

Produce Flight
Control
Commands

2.1.5

Produce Sensor
Control
Commands

2.1.6

Compute
Nav igation
Solution

Demodulate
Ref erence Signal

1.2.3
1.1.5

Manipulate
Surv eillance
Product

2.2.3
1.3.7

1.1.6

Interf ace With
C2ISR

1.3.9

1.3.8

2.1.7

Demodulate
Sensor Data
f rom UAVs

Track Mission
Status

Compute UAV
Control
Commands

Compute Sensor
Control
Commands

Compute
Sensor Solution

Modulate
Communications
Data

1.2.4

2.2.4
1.3.10

Transmit and
Receiv e
Modulated
Ground Data

Modulate
Sensor Data f or
GCU

Accept GPS
Receiv er Signal

2.2.5

Transmit and
Receiv e
Modulated
Airborne Data

Figure 26 - BATCAM SV-4 Functional Decomposition Diagram

The two main activities that were added need to be allocated to functions are “displaying
system confidence” and “acknowledging operator commands”. The CUSS software is the
system that is best suited to compute the system confidence, and hence will be added as a
function underneath it. The Computing Device will display the system confidence to the user.
This system is currently not shown and needs to be added as a sub-function under Perform
Ground Control Functions. It is important to take into account the system display because past
research efforts have shown that the manner that system confidence is displayed has a direct
impact on operator reliance upon the automation. (Jamieson, Wang, & Neyedli, 2008)
Determining the best method for displaying data is left as a recommendation for further study in
Chapter 5. Finally, acknowledging operator commands is a function that must originate from the
aircraft control unit and therefore is added under Perform Airborne Control Unit Functions.
Figure 27 and Figure 28 represent the BATCAM SV-4 diagrams with trust factors added.
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Figure 27: SV-4 Diagram with Trust Factors Added
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4.4.3.2 Informational
The information flows between system components as well as between system
automation and the operator are vital in designing for appropriate trust. For example, certain
nodes will need to provide detailed information to related nodes in order to calculate and display
system confidence to the operator. The OV-7 Logical Data model is a current architecture
diagram that details the information flows that occur during operational activities. The diagram
below is an example OV-7 for a BATCAM CUSS related system that was developed by AFIT
students.
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Figure 29: CUSS Related OV-7 Logical Data Model
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In order to calculate UAS system confidence, the algorithm that computes the trust factor
needs to obtain information from the different nodes that contain the information. For example,
the airframe’s position and time references are vital components in ensuring that the UAS is
flying at the coordinates the operator commanded it to. In addition, environment factors that
affect the performance of the aircraft, such as wind speed, provide additional information that
may cause the aircraft to deviate from its course. This is especially true in smaller airframes
such as the BATCAM UAV. The operators consistently performed visual checks on the aircraft
during test flights when the winds were high to ensure it was flying on the preprogrammed path
and at the correct altitude. Figure 30 portrays the OV-7 Logical Data Model after the system
confidence node was included along with the varying information exchanges that are required to
display the measure to the operator.
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Figure 30: CUSS Related OV-7 Logical Data Model with Trust Factors Included

4.4.3.3 Sequence/Temporal
The temporal architecture views provide an opportunity to examine the tasks that are
completed during each scenario and when they are completed with relation to the other tasks.
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This breakdown of scenarios provides engineers the information necessary to add the additional
tasks outlined in the functional diagrams in the appropriate place to provide pertinent
information to the operator at the right time. In addition, the sequence diagrams provide the
framework for deciding the type and level of automation that is most effective for each scenario.
Figure 31 is an OV-6C Operational Event Diagram depicting the sequence of events that would
occur during normal convoy route surveillance or surveillance of a town.
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Dispatch
Rearrange UAVs

Loiter Target
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Follow Target

Return from POI
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Rearrange Formation
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Designate Points

Dispatch
Survey Point

Figure 31: OV-6c Operational Event Diagram for BATCAM Route Surveillance

One of the tasks added in the Functional diagrams designed for increased trust was the
acknowledgement of commands from the UAV to the operator. Commands should be
acknowledged as soon as they are received in order to allow the operator to form realistic
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expectations of system behavior. Figure 32 portrays the Operational Event Diagram updated to
reflect these acknowledgements.
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Dispatch
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Figure 32: Operational Event Diagram for BATCAM Route Surveillance with Trust Factors Added

As mentioned before, sequence diagrams also help determine the most effective level and
type of automation for each scenario. In Figures 31 and 32, the first half of the scenario deals
with normal convoy route surveillance. The terrain in this situation is less dynamic and
threatening and operators would utilize higher levels of automation to conduct the surveillance.
The latter half of the diagram represents the surveillance that would occur as the convoy enters a
town. This scenario is more dynamic with potentially higher levels of threat and therefore the
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operator would need greater SA in order to improve his chances of locating threats in a timely
manner. Engineers may want to consider automation that adapts to operator needs and
situational conditions, such as that described by Parasuraman, et al. (2007), in these scenarios to
enhance mission effectiveness.
4.4.3.4 Structural
After an architect is finished applying the trust lens to ensure that appropriate trust
dependencies have been included in system design, it is essential to examine the structural layout
of the system in order to make certain that the interconnections and interfaces exist between the
different subsystems to facilitate system functionality. Figure 33 portrays the BATCAM SV-01
Systems and Services Interfaces Description.
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Figure 33 - BATCAM SV-01 System Interface Diagram

80

Airborne
System 2

First, it is necessary to know where the added trust functions would exist in the structural
view. According to Figure 27, the task "acknowledge operator commands" would reside in the
Airborne Control Unit, "calculate system confidence" would be in the CUSS Software, and
"display system confidence" would be the responsibility of the Computing Device. To
accomplish these tasks, the systems that perform the functions must interface with each other.
Examining Figure 33, it is apparent the Airborne System interfaces with the Ground System via
Comm and Sensor Data Links. Therefore, no additional interfaces need to be implemented in
order to facilitate the acknowledgement of operator commands.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions
The increasing complexity of automated systems, and the need to operate them in ever
greater numbers with fewer human operators, requires close examination of the relationship
between human and machine. This is especially true in the cognitive domain, which is difficult
to quantify, model, and measure objectively. Trust is one of the most important aspects of
man/machine relationships due to its impact on the human operator's willingness to use the
automated system to its full potential. However, operators must also recognize the limitations
inherent in the system automation and intervene when the automation’s capability has been
exceeded. Failure to trust appropriately often results in decreased mission effectiveness and
sometimes in catastrophe.
Due to this mis-calibration of trust, systems engineers must understand how trust is
formed, maintained, and lost, and account for man/machine trust relationships during system
design. This is especially important for distributed systems such as UASs, where operators are
not physically present to observe system behavior. The following conclusions from this effort's
research questions represent a means to that end.
5.1.1 Can previous research be used to create a useful trust model for systems engineering?
A review of trust-related literature spanning more than fifty years of research enabled the
creation of a pedigreed trust model. Although based on established sources by respected
researchers, the model itself is an unprecedented attempt to enable the integration of human
operator trust within system architectures. This model describes the interaction of context and
perception to form expectations, which are the primary inputs to trust. It portrays the attributes
(bases) and methods (dynamics) that define trust itself, and the effect of trust on operator
decisions (reliance). It depicts reliance as it affects the outcome of actions taken by the operator
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and/or system. Lastly, it acknowledges the evolving nature of the trust attitude over time with a
feedback loop from event outcome(s) to context. The inclusion of social and individual context
as inputs to trust also acknowledges its evolving nature, since context derives largely from prior
experience. The model is underpinned by the mapping of trust-related factors to the elements of
a decision tree representing the reliance decision itself, including an assignment of probability
and utility of the possible outcomes of the decision.
Since the model developed here is based on decades of precedent, it is not surprising to
note that it bears similarities to segments of previous models (Muir, 1994); (Lee & See, 2004).
Specifically, Muir's (1994) model of trust forms the basis for much of the current understanding
of trust itself, i.e. its attributes and dynamics. Meanwhile, Lee & See's (2004, p. 68) broader
model portrays the influence of context on expectations (shown as belief), trust, and reliance and
the direct impact of expectations on trust, and trust on reliance. The model presented here,
however, separates perception from context and depicts their association through the formation
of expectations which influence trust. Further, this model decomposes perception and context
into subclasses known to affect trust. This decomposition enables systems engineers to address
each in the most suitable way when designing the system.
So, while the model proposed here is by no means the only “correct” way to portray trust,
the model is useful to systems engineers by providing a concrete understanding of trust
relationships in a way compatible with the development of system architecture. Thus, the model
allows system architects to apply a trust lens to develop automation that is more responsive to
specific perceptual and contextual needs of the user. The model also allows architects and other
decision makers to address other aspects of the trust relationship through organization, training,
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etc. The enhanced trust relationship may improve mission effectiveness by decreasing misuse
and disuse of automation.
5.1.2 How can trust be considered explicitly within DoDAF?
In order for a trust model to be relevant to systems engineering, it must be applicable to
the process of planning and designing systems to achieve required capabilities. The pedigreed
model developed in this research is intended as such a resource. The model's representation as a
UML class diagram enables direct linkages between portions of the trust model and components
of system software and hardware. These linkages allow systems engineers to reinforce realistic
trust by shaping operator expectations. For example, improving transparency (e.g. acknowledge
commands) while adapting system behavior to account for operator perception (e.g. adaptive
automation to affect situational awareness) makes systems more predictable, and thus improves
trust.
More importantly, the trust lens, or understanding of trust's impact on system
effectiveness fostered by the model, can be applied continuously during the architecture
development process. This focus on process over specific products is consistent with the future
direction of the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008). Focusing on process
also makes the model more broadly useful, since it is not specific to a particular framework or set
of standards. This flexibility ensures the model will remain useful as frameworks change or fitfor-purpose views are created.
As with most aspects of HSI, the trust lens is most effective in improving system
performance when it is applied from the outset. As discussed in Chapter 4, trust relationships
can begin to be evaluated from the moment system requirements begin to be defined. However,
as the BATCAM example shows, there is also value in considering trust later in the lifecycle. In
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short, the application of a trust lens to system architecture can enhance the relationship between
humans and automation, and potentially improve system effectiveness.
5.1.3 Can the utility of architecting trust be demonstrated on a given UAS architecture?
By applying a process-oriented approach to architecture development using a trust lens,
may be possible to improve the trust relationship between the operator and automation, primarily
by increasing transparency and predictability of key functions. As mentioned, while one would
expect the trust lens to be most effective when employed from the beginning of architecture
development, it might also be applicable to existing systems to improve performance, as
demonstrated with the BATCAM example. However, further testing is required to quantify
actual improvement to mission effectiveness.
The utility of the trust model, and its use to evaluate architecture through a trust lens, was
demonstrated theoretically by considering an existing, though immature, UAS architecture under
specific surveillance scenarios. After the addition of trust-related tasks and information
exchanges, additional knowledge is available to the operator (e.g. transition between operating
modes, system confidence in its ability to operate effectively within a defined envelope, etc).
This increased awareness may enable more realistic expectations and thus improve trust.
Appropriate trust, in turn, should improve system effectiveness and enable transition from
multiple operators on one UAV to one operator multiple UAVs.
This qualitative evaluation, however, is of limited use in determining the full potential of
a “trust lens approach” to system architecture. A quantitative evaluation of system effectiveness
before and after the inclusion of trust is necessary in order to fully address this research question.
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5.2 Recommendations
5.2.1 Develop Comprehensive Test Plan to Quantify Utility of Architecting Trust
One of the main objectives of this thesis was to demonstrate the utility of architecting
trust on a given UAS architecture. However, a thorough test and evaluation was not
accomplished due to time constraints and the immaturity of AFIT's multi-UAV implementation
of BATCAM system. Therefore, the research team recommends a follow-on study to develop a
comprehensive test plan including detailed measures of performance, effectiveness, and
suitability, to examine how the system performs before and after trust relationships are integrated
into the architecture. The test can be either conducted on the BATCAM UAS when it reaches a
state of maturity that will allow sufficient test data to be collected, a similar single operator
multi-UAV system, or any operationally relevant system with complex operator-automation
interaction. The collection and analysis of test data will ultimately prove whether mission
effectiveness is enhanced by engineering for appropriate trust.
5.2.2 Extend Trust Model to Show Team Collaboration
The notional trust model that was developed in Chapter 3 represents one operator
interacting with a particular system. However, most military engagements are never this simple.
In real-world systems, multiple operators interact with one another and a variety of systems.
Therefore, to extend the utility of this research, it would be beneficial to extend the trust model
to incorporate team collaboration and the interdependencies of trust between different operators.
A researcher may be able to use the Distributed Common Ground Systems (DCGS) or similar
team environment, for the basis of their study of the trust interactions, interdependencies, and
relationships in a collaborative atmosphere.
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5.2.3 Perform HFE Study to Determine Most Effective Means to Convey Trust Data
Architecting for trust alone will not necessarily lead an operator to more appropriately
rely on automation. Instead, trust related data depicted in the architecture must be properly
conveyed to the operator. Jamieson, et al. (2008) conducted experiments and developed several
display prototypes that represented trust factor information (i.e. displaying system confidence) to
the user in different ways. The data they collected during the experiment indicated that the
manner in which the data was presented affected the participants’ reliance upon the system
(Jamieson, Wang, & Neyedli, 2008). Therefore, the system interface design should account for
these factors and displays trust factors in a manner which induces appropriate operator reliance
upon the system. This research group recommends a human factors engineering (HFE) study of
how to appropriately convey trust-related data to UAV operators (e.g. visual, auditory, size/color
of display, etc.).
5.2.4 Develop State Transition Diagram for Evolution of Human/Machine Trust
The main goal of this research effort was to incorporate trust into system architecture in
order to foster appropriate trust. As operators interact with systems repeatedly over time, the
trust relationship should evolve to where the user has appropriate trust in the system and is not
misusing or disusing the system. The goal in applying a trust lens is to minimize this evolution
time and to drive the operator to the appropriate trust state. Therefore, the authors recommend a
study to develop a state transition diagram or similar temporal flow diagram that describes the
evolution of operator/automation trust over time for a specific system and/or set of scenarios.
5.2.5 Determine Appropriate Degree of Transparency
The authors of this research have advocated designing systems with transparency of
automation to help facilitate appropriate trust. However, the scope of this research did not allow
determination of the most effective level or type of transparency. For example, if transparency is
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insufficient operators may not trust the system to produce a desired outcome. Conversely, too
much transparency of system behavior has the potential to overwhelm the operator with
unnecessary information. Previous research efforts have addressed similar concerns; for
example, Cummings, et al. has measured the effects of different levels of automation on
situational awareness and reliance (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008); (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier,
& Mitchell, 2007). However, the authors are not aware of any research that has attempted to
balance the trust benefits of transparency with the limited processing ability of human operators.
Therefore, the authors recommend a study to determine the degree of transparency that will best
enhance mission effectiveness for a given system.
5.2.6 Develop a Trust Profile
Reliance is a decision based largely on the trust attitude (Lee & See, Trust in Automation:
Designing for Appropriate Reliance, 2004). Prior studies have proposed methods to measure
trust empirically (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000), yet have not attempted to predict differences in
behavior based on the measured degree of trust. Expected utility theory, meanwhile, contends
that individuals tend to make different decisions in the same situation depending on their risk
attitude (e.g. risk seeking, risk neutral, or risk averse.) Since the need to trust is explicitly tied to
the presence of uncertainty and risk in a given situation (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla,
1998), it follows that an individual's inclination to trust may bear some relation to their risk
attitude as described in utility theory, and hence affects their behavior.
Bhattacharya, et al.'s (1998) research on trust relates to utility theory in its attention to
risk, but could be extended by developing a trust profile similar to that for risk in utility theory.
In addition, a model of "trust patterns" then could be developed and applied to identify the
tendencies of individuals with different trust patterns, and modify the behavior of automation
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(e.g. amount and type of information presented to a specific operator) in order to elicit
appropriate trust from specific individuals in response. Adjusting for individual inclination to
trust will negate one of the limitations identified during the development of the trust model
discussed in Chapter 3. If applied correctly with the present trust model during system design,
engineers may be better able to induce appropriate trust regardless of individual inclination.
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Appendix A – Trust Lens Implementation Guide
While the research presented here was inspired by the need for improved UAV
automation, the authors believe the “trust lens” can be applied to improve the effectiveness of
any system in which humans interact with complex automation. Thus, systems engineers,
program managers, and the like may wonder how they can apply the trust model presented here
to their specific program. The following quick reference guide is provided as a starting point for
considering trust during system architecture development. It relates the trust model elements
most immediately relevant for consideration during each architecture development step. Keep in
mind that the architecture development steps are iterative, not sequential.
Steps 1 & 2: Determine Scope and View
-

Identify human/machine relationships and dependencies
Plan for impact of context on the operator’s trust in the system (see sections 2.2.1.1 and
3.2.2)
o Consider existing/desired social and organizational context (see section 2.2.2)
o Begin to shape individual context by identifying manpower, personnel, and
training (MPT) requirements (see sections 2.5 and 3.2.2)

Steps 3 & 4: Determine Data Required & Collect, Organize, Correlate and Store the Data
-

-

Use scenario data (e.g. sequence diagrams) to model and predict operator perception (e.g.
SA, time stress) under expected conditions (see sections 2.2.1.5, 3.2.1, 4.3.2.3 and
4.4.3.3)
Design automation to elicit realistic expectations by providing appropriate transparency
and predictability of system state (see sections 2.2.2, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3)

Steps 5 & 6: Conduct Analysis and Document Results
-

-

Validate or refine MPT requirements that affect context, scenarios that affect operator
perception models, and design requirements to improve automation transparency and
predictability
Build architecture, incorporating tasks and information flows identified in steps 3 & 4
Refine and finalize training objectives and scenarios to represent system behavior in
operationally realistic conditions
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Appendix B – Glossary
Ability: the group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable the trustee to influence
the domain. (Lee & See, 2004)
Adaptive Automation: automation that adapts to the needs of the operator in a given situation
by altering its behavior, e.g. shifts from fully automated to compliance-oriented to minimal
decision support, when the system reaches predetermined states
Appropriateness of trust: the relationship between the true capabilities of the agent and the
level of trust (Lee & See, 2004)
Attitude: an affective evaluation of beliefs that guides people to adopt a particular intention.
(Lee & See, 2004)
Automation: the technology that actively selects data, transforms information, makes decisions,
or controls processes. (Lee & See, 2004)
Automation bias: a decision bias that occurs when operators become over-reliant on the
automation and do not verify the accuracy of automated recommendations. (Cummings, Bruni,
Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007)
Battlespace: The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to
successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02,
2001)
Belief: any cognitive content held as true (Dictionary.com, 2006)
Benevolence: the extent to which the intents and motivations of the trustee are aligned with
those of the trustor. (Lee & See, 2004)
Calibration: the correspondence between a person’s trust in the automation and the
automation’s capabilities. (Lee & Moray, Trust, self-confidence, and operators' adaptation to
automation, 1994) (Muir, 1987)
Capability: the ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be
accompanied by an intention.) (Joint Pub 1-02, 2001)
Complacency: overreliance resulting in failure to monitor the “raw” information sources that
provide input to the automated system. (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, Situation
Awareness, Mental Workload, and Trust in Automation: Viable, Empirically Supported
Cognitive Engineering Constructs, 2008)
Compliance-oriented automation: automation indicates an abnormal situation, and the
operators act in response to this indicator. (Lee & See, 2004)
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Confidence: a level of expectation associated with a particular prediction or belief.
Context, individual: a specific person’s history of interactions with the trustee, as well as their
general inclination to trust, which can vary from one individual to the next. (Lee & See, 2004)
Context, organizational: interactions between people that inform them about the
trustworthiness of others, which can include reputation and gossip. (Lee & See, 2004)
Context, situational: interactions between people and the environment and current state of the
system
Context, social: a set of social norms and expectations that influence trust through shared
educational and life experiences associated with cultural differences or distinct groups of
workers.
Controls: the rules, doctrine, regulations, or other documents that prescribe how
an action is to take place, what course the activity must follow, and, what form or
format is expected/required for the result. (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008)
Dependability: the extent to which the trustee can be relied upon. (Muir, 1994)
Disuse: failures that occur when people reject the capabilities of automation. (Lee & See, 2004)
Effectiveness: adequate to accomplish a purpose; producing the intended or expected result
(Dictionary.com, 2006)
Environment: the aggregate of surrounding things, conditions, or influences; surroundings;
milieu. (Dictionary.com, 2006)
Expectation: belief about (or mental picture of) the future (Dictionary.com, 2006)
Expected Utility Theorem: predicts that the "betting preferences" of people with regard to
uncertain outcomes can be described by a mathematical relation which takes into account the
size of a payout, the probability of occurrence, risk aversion, and the different utility of the same
payout to people with different assets or personal preferences. (Wikipedia contributors, 2009)
Experience: knowledge or practical wisdom gained from what one has observed, encountered,
or undergone (Dictionary.com, 2006)
Faith: a judgment that the trustee can be relied on, even though specific actions and their
outcomes may be unknown at the time. Also, a closure against doubt in the face of an uncertain
future. (Muir, 1994)
Fiduciary Responsibility: an assumption that the trustee will act appropriately when trustee
competence is unknown. e.g. An operator assumes a system will meet its design-based
performance criteria when it is operating as intended. (Muir, 1994)
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General Inclination: the inherent tendency a specific individual has to place trust in an
unknown system
Human System Integration: The interdisciplinary technical and management processes for
integrating human considerations within and across all system elements; an essential enabler to
systems engineering practice (INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook)
Importance: the value of the expected outcome to the trustor. (Bhattacharya, Devinney, &
Pillutla, 1998)
Information element: a formalized representation of information subject to an operational
process (e.g., the information content that is required to be exchanged between nodes). (DoDAF
Version 1.5, 2007)
Information exchange: an act of exchanging information between two distinct operational
nodes. Characteristics of the act include the information element that needs to be
exchanged and its attributes (e.g., Scope), as well as attributes associated with the exchange (e.g.,
Transaction Type). (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007)
Inputs: the triggers that cause an activity to occur, along with data or information
needed to perform the desired action. (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008)
Integrity: the degree to which the trustee adheres to a set of principles the trustor finds
acceptable. (Lee & See, 2004)
Interaction Time: the time it takes for a human to interact with the automation to raise the
performance to an acceptable level. (Cummings & Mitchell, 2008)
Interface: a common boundary or interconnection between systems, equipment, concepts, or
human beings. (Dictionary.com, 2006)
Mechanisms: see Resources.
Mental Workload: the relation between the function relating the mental resources by a task and
those resources available to be supplied by the human operator. (Parasuraman, Sheridan, &
Wickens, Situation Awareness, Mental Workload, and Trust in Automation: Viable, Empirically
Supported Cognitive Engineering Constructs, 2008)
Misuse: failures that occur when people inadvertently violate critical assumptions and rely on
automation inappropriately. (Lee & See, 2004)
Operator Perception: an operator's intuitive or mental representation of certain factors that
affect expectations and attitudes
Outcome: An end result; a consequence (Dictionary.com, 2006)
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Outputs: the results of activity performance. These can be outputs of products,
services, or requirements for further action, or outcomes (i.e. demonstration that an
action has produced a desired change.) (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008)
Performance: the competency or expertise as demonstrated by its ability to achieve the
operator’s goals. (Lee & See, 2004)
Persistence: an expectation of constancy, which, for example, allows the operator to construct a
mental model of the automation through experience interacting with it. (Muir, 1994)
Predictability: visibility of specific behaviors, or performance, that allow operators to judge
automation based on its ability to deliver consistent and desirable results.
Process: the degree to which the automation’s algorithms are appropriate for the situation and
able to achieve the operator’s goals. (Lee & See, 2004)
Purpose: the degree to which the automation is being used within the realm of the designer’s
intent. (Lee & See, 2004)
Quale: a term used in philosophy to describe the subjective quality of conscious experience.
(Wikipedia contributors , 2009)
Queuing Time: the amount of time a decision is prolonged due to the presence of multiple tasks.
Reliance: a behavior representing the operator’s intention or willingness to act, in the form of a
decision to use or not to use automation.
Resolution: how precisely a judgment of trust differentiates levels of automation capability.
(Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998)
Resources: those things that assist in performance of the activity. These can be physical, logical,
technological, or human resources. (DoDAF Version 2.0, 2008)
Risk: exposure to the chance of injury or loss. (Dictionary.com, 2006)
Self-Confidence: confidence in one's own judgment, ability, power, etc. (Dictionary.com, 2006)
Situational Awareness: perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time
and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near
future. (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, Situation Awareness, Mental Workload, and Trust
in Automation: Viable, Empirically Supported Cognitive Engineering Constructs, 2008)
Specificity: the degree to which trust is associated with a particular component or aspect of the
trustee. (Lee & See, 2004)
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Specificity, functional: the differentiation of functions, subfunctions, and modes of automation.
e.g. With high functional specificity, a person’s trust reflects capabilities of specific subfunctions
and modes. Low functional specificity means the person’s trust reflects the capabilities of the
entire system. (Lee & See, 2004)
Specificity, temporal: changes in trust as a function of the situation or over time. e.g. High
temporal specificity means that a person’s trust reflects moment-to-moment fluctuations in
automation capability, whereas low temporal specificity means that the trust reflects only longterm changes in automation capability. (Lee & See, 2004)
Stakes: the consequences of a mistake, or, similar to importance, the value to the operator of
achieving a desired outcome.
Strength: some degree of confidence in the expected outcome. (Bhattacharya, Devinney, &
Pillutla, 1998)
Suitability: the quality of having the properties that are right for a specific purpose
(Dictionary.com, 2006)
System nodes: containers for service software items along with the corresponding infrastructure
software items and physical computing resource items that enable their existence. A system node
may contain one or many service, software, and hardware items. (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007)
System State: the dynamic behaviors concerning the timing and sequencing of events that
capture system performance characteristics of an executing system (DoDAF Version 1.5, 2007)
Technical Competence: the trustor believes the trustee has the ability to perform the assigned
task successfully. (Muir, 1994)
Time Stress: perceived cost of delay, e.g. when cost of delay is great, action is more imperative,
even with high uncertainty about trust. (Cohen, Parasuraman, & Freeman, 1998)
Training: to coach in or accustom to a mode of behavior or performance (Dictionary.com, 2006)
Transparency: the full, accurate, and timely disclosure of information (Dictionary.com, 2006)
Trust: the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation
characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability. (Lee & See, 2004)
Trust Lens: an evaluation of systems architectures by a systems engineer, human factors
engineer, or other professional to plan for appropriate trust relationships
Uncertainty: consequences of alternative courses of action are not always known or predictable.
(Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998)
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Unpredictability, apparent: inability to predict behavior due to interaction with an unstable
environment, rather than the nature of the system itself.
Unpredictability, inherent: inability to predict behavior due to the nature of the system or
automation.
Use: refers to the situations where an operators places appropriate trust in the system; i.e. does
not misuse or disuse the automation.
Wait Time: the expected amount of time a task or decision will delayed before an operator
addresses it.
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